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Introduction 
 From the end of the Second World War until the height of the Vietnam War in 1968, 
the United States Armed Forces sought to improve its shoulder fired rifles through increasing 
firepower. The United States sat at the forefront of small arms technology at the end of the 
Second World War, being the only combatant nation to issue semi-automatic weapons to 
every soldier. The M1 Garand service rifle, the first semi-automatic standard service rifle 
anywhere in the world, gave the American G.I. a distinct advantage over his Axis enemy in 
the Second World War. The semi-automatic technology of the American rifles increased the 
rate of accurate fire several fold over the nineteenth century rifle designs fielded by other 
armies.  However, near the end of the war, high-ranking officials in United States Army 
Ordnance, the chief research and development agency for the American Armed Forces, saw 
that the American arsenal needed improvement and streamlining. 
 The M1 Garand, so revolutionary when adopted in the 1930’s, began approaching 
obsolescence by 1945. The Second World War spurred great leaps and bounds in small arms 
manufacture and design. Germany pioneered new ideas in rifle design, manufacture, and 
cartridges culminating in the Sturmgewehr series, the first assault rifles. These rifles used 
stamped sheet metal pressings and Bakelite to create light weight rifles that were easy, fast, 
and inexpensive to produce. The effective use of these rifles influenced the arms 
development programs of several European nations following the war. However, United 
States Army Ordnance paid little attention to the German wartime developments. 
 The high-ranking officials of United States Army Ordnance saw the German 
developments as crude and desperate, a mere consequence of shortages in vital production 
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materials. According to the conservative mentality of United States Army Ordnance, a proper 
rifle came from finely machined forgings of steel, stocked with hardwood such as birch or 
walnut. The only German wartime development imported to America was the idea of an 
intermediate length cartridge. However, the short-ranges of these cartridges motivated 
American ordnance officials to modify their version of an intermediate cartridge to suit their 
traditional long-range performance standards. 
 The post war environment and developing Cold War gave birth to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. This alliance system sought to standardize small arms 
designs and cartridges to solve the logistical problems encountered in the Second World War. 
In 1950, the divergent European and American small arms developments came into 
competition with the first set of light rifle trials. The European rifles submitted by Belgium 
and the United Kingdom for performance testing contrasted greatly with the more traditional 
American design. These rifles were more than just competing designs; they represented stark 
contrasts in the vision of modern infantry warfare. While the Europeans saw modern infantry 
warfare characterized by fierce short-range engagements with a high volume of fire, the 
American vision of future wars continued to focus on the need for long-range precision 
engagements requiring full power cartridges with high accuracy.  
 The resulting competition between European and American designs in cartridges and 
rifle platforms seriously strained relations between the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The nearly four year long ordeal ended with the European nations finally bending 
to the American desire for a long-range powerful rifle cartridge, hoping the spirit of 
cooperation might help in the NATO adoption of a single rifle platform. This concession, led 
by the United Kingdom, ultimately failed, as America continued along its own path of arms 
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development apart from its European allies. This outcome of the European-American rifle 
divide only contributed to the eventual failure of NATO weapons standardization as a whole. 
The injection of nationalism and domestic politics prevented the realization of streamlining 
logistics amongst NATO allies. NATO eventually adopted a single rifle cartridge based on 
the American vision of modern warfare in 1954, but could not agree on a common rifle 
design, resulting in the adoption of multiple rifle platforms in the organization.  
 For a brief time in 1956, the traditional source of military arms, United States Army 
Ordnance, faced a challenge from the domestic commercial sector. The new firm of 
Armalite, an arms division of a well-established aircraft manufacturer, took the German 
developments of World War 2, and sought a different path to the same end, a light weight 
rifle. Armalite used new aluminum alloys and plastics technology in place of the stamped 
steel and Bakelite construction of German wartime arms to create a light rifle. The resulting 
rifle, the AR-10, ultimately came too late to halt the adoption of the more developed Army 
Ordnance rifle, but created an interest amongst high level American military commanders in 
finding alternatives to traditional rifles. 
 While on the surface, United States Army Ordnance looked solidly united in its views 
on modern combat, strong dissent ultimately grew from civilian analysts and younger 
ordnance officers. From 1950 to 1953, several studies began to shed doubt on the official 
traditionalist views held by top Army Ordnance leadership. The Operations Research Office 
of Johns Hopkins University studied rifle effectiveness in the Korean War in 1950, revealing 
the inability of infantry soldiers to fire rifles effectively past 300 yards. Some engineers at the 
Ballistics Research Laboratory, aware of limited range warfare in Korea, created effective 
short-range cartridges based on the small caliber high velocity concept. This concept sought 
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to avoid the short-range, accuracy, and power limitations of the intermediate cartridge, while 
maintaining the benefits of lighter weight and greater firepower. Ultimately, the traditionalist 
Chief of Army Ordnance Rifle Development felt threatened by the new cartridge projects and 
used his authority to assign a low priority to all reduced caliber projects. The low priority 
status significantly reduced funding for all small caliber projects, taking them out of the 
competition against the traditional rifle projects promoted by Army Ordnance officials. 
However, the studies and projects backed by these civilians and junior officers created an 
interest outside Army Ordnance in promoting dramatic technological changes in weaponry.  
 In 1957, the separate paths of American commercial arms development and the new 
weapons approach of junior ordnance officers converged. High ranking military officers in 
Continental Army Command requested that civilian arms makers develop prototypes 
specifically made for the small caliber high velocity cartridges. They shared the earlier 
research of the Ballistics Research Laboratory with the Armalite and Winchester Arms 
companies. The resulting 1959 tests of the newly-developed rifles, especially the Armalite 
AR-15 model, offered the first significant domestic competition for United States Army 
Ordnance. However, decisions about the ultimate choice of design remained tense. Several 
suspicious events occurred during the trials of the Armalite AR-15, suggesting sabotage and 
biased testing procedures on the part of traditional minded Army Ordnance officials.  
 In May 1957, America replaced the M1 Garand with the M-14 rifle, a marginally 
improved version of the Garand that fulfilled only a few of the original requirements placed 
upon the developmental Light Rifle Project. While this caused little controversy, the M-14 
project became an ordeal of failure upon failure on the part of Army Ordnance. The adoption 
of the M-14 in May 1957 did not mean the new rifles made it into the hands of troops. 
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Procurement of the new rifles lagged years behind schedule, plagued by poor management 
and political meddling in the business of contracting arms production to civilian arms 
manufacturers. The American public learned of the problems during the Berlin Wall crisis of 
1961, when the American garrison of West Berlin, as well as their reinforcements, still 
carried the old M1 Garand. At the time, this crisis symbolized America’s stand against 
communist aggression, but frontline troops did not even have access to the new M-14 rifles. 
The resulting congressional investigation seriously tarnished the reputation of Army 
Ordnance, and soon the Secretary of Defense began to look for alternatives to the M-14. 
 Colt Firearms bought the AR-15 design from Armalite in 1959 and from 1960 to 
1961, the firm pushed hard to market the AR-15 to the United States Air Force. While Army 
Ordnance refused to test the Colt AR-15 for consideration as an Army rifle, the Pentagon 
forced Army Ordnance to complete an objective series of tests on the AR-15, which the rifle 
passed. The Air Force officially adopted the design in 1961, causing the Secretary of Defense 
to take notice of the increasingly good reports on the AR-15 rifle in various trials. The 
continuing problem of delays in M-14 production eventually caused the Secretary of Defense 
to end procurement contracts and close Springfield Armory, the research and developmental 
center for United States Army Ordnance. To supplement the meager amount of M-14 rifles 
on hand, the U.S. Military purchased nearly 100, 000 AR-15 rifles. However as future long 
term rifle development projects became increasingly unlikely, and America became more 
heavily involved in Southeast Asia, the Department of Defense officially adopted the AR-15 
as the M-16 standard service rifle for all armed forces. 
 However, with the elimination of Army Ordnance’s monopoly of power on rifle 
development, throughout 1963 the Secretary of Defense personally oversaw and created new 
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offices and committees to oversee the procurement of M-16 rifles. The new Technical 
Coordination Committee and inter-service feuding between branches of the military caused 
significant delays and changes in both the M-16 and the cartridge it fired. When the M-16 
rifle finally entered full service in 1966, reports of severe malfunctions soon began to reach 
the Pentagon. The rifle and ammunition that had performed well in trails now failed 
miserably in actual combat. Throughout 1966 and early 1967, the Department of Defense 
failed to address the problem. Congress again became involved in the rifle issue after a 
congressional representative read a letter from a marine serving in Vietnam. The letter 
testified that the M-16 was failing and servicemen were dying because the rifle 
malfunctioned in the field. The resulting investigation placed blame on Colt Firearms, the 
Department of Defense, the Technical Coordination Committee, as well as several 
individuals for the debacle. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the same secretary who 
had effectively shut down Army Ordnance for failing in its M-14 project as proven by a 
congressional investigation, now faced the same crisis.  Congress recommended several 
reversals in policy in order to get the M-16 program working properly and the rifle 
functioning in the field. Ultimately, these changes brought reliability back into tolerable 
levels. The M-16 rifle and procurement program continued throughout the Vietnam era, but 
remained severely tarnished in reputation. 
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The Light Rifle Project and NATO Standardization 
 In the Second World War, the United States was the only nation in the world that 
issued autoloading1 firearms standard to all combat personnel. While the other Allies and 
Axis nations designed and fielded some weapons that were autoloading, these new weapons 
never saw universal use as standard arms to all combat troops. Throughout the Second World 
War, the vast majority of both the United States allies and enemies continued to issue bolt 
action rifles designed in the late nineteenth century as their standard combat rifle.  The U.S. 
Rifle, Caliber .30 M1 (more commonly known as the M1 Garand or Garand after its 
inventor) had been thoroughly tested in the fire of combat. Douglas McArthur praised the 
rifle extensively, recollecting that at Bataan in the Philippines, he witnessed some Garands 
that had seen constant use for over a week without either cleaning or lubrication2. General 
George Patton said the M1 Garand was “The greatest battle implement ever devised”3. 
Certainly, the Garand was better than the 1903 Springfield that it had replaced, but the 
platform was far from perfect. It possessed several idiosyncrasies that the United States 
Army Ordnance Department felt made the rifle inadequate for future combat.  The Garand 
was utterly reliable in the field; however, there were complaints from soldiers about the 
Garand’s odd method of loading and feeding cartridges into the chamber.  
 Users of the Garand inserted an “en bloc” or clip4 of preloaded ammunition cartridges 
into the rifle through the top of the receiver with the bolt retracted. While this method was 
                                                 
1
 A gun that is autoloading has a mechanism that ejects the fired case or shell, puts a new one in the chamber 
and prepares the gun to be fired by cocking the hammer or striker.   
2
  Hatcher, Julian. The Book of the Garand.(Washington DC: Sportsman’s Press Book, 1948), 5 
3
 Stevens, Blake R. The FAL Rifle. (Toronto: Collectors Press Publications. 1993). 2 
4
 Technically, a clip is any type of cartridge-holding device used to load magazines (either fixed or detachable). 
Common usage, though, frequently interchanges the term 'clip' with 'magazine'. The first successful cartridge 
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fast, field use showed several problems with this system. First, on some Garand rifles, when 
inserting the clip of ammunition, the bolt could come forward with great velocity under 
pressure of the recoil spring and trap the users thumb between the bolt and the receiver, 
causing an effect known as “Garand thumb”. The injury is something similar to what 
carpenters sustain when hitting their thumb with a hammer while holding a nail in place.  
 The second issue also revolved around the clip of the Garand. When a soldier fired 
the last round from the rifle, the empty cartridge ejected from the rifle, but the clip was 
ejected as well. Normally this would not have any ill effect on the user or the rifle. However, 
the ejection of the clip caused a loud and distinct ping sound. This sound could give away the 
position of the user, a dangerous occurrence in fierce combat.  The Garand rifle also becomes 
a single shot rifle without the clip, causing concerns about the loss of effectiveness.  The en 
bloc clip could not be topped off with loose rounds of ammunition when partially full, 
forcing the operator to fire off the remaining rounds of ordnance before he could load a new 
clip filled to capacity. Several designers, including John Garand, sought to modify the 
Garand in the late stages of the Second World War to rid the platform of these troublesome 
operational issues.  
 The head of United States Army Ordnance Rifle Development during the Second 
World War was Colonel Rene Studler5. Colonel Studler believed the deficiencies in the 
Garand platform to be correctible and ordered the initiation of two Garand improvement 
projects in 1944, resulting in the T20 and T22 rifles. These new rifles, designed by a team led 
                                                                                                                                                       
clip was invented by Austrian engineer Ferdinand von Mannlicher. Also known as a 'stripper clip' in military 
jargon, and as a 'charger' in England. 
5
 Stevens, Blake R. The FAL Rifle. 2 
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by John Garand himself, experimented with converting the M1 Garand from semi-automatic6 
to select fire7, and from using en-bloc clips to detachable magazines8. The projects showed 
some promise, but when the war was ending in the spring of 1945, Col. Studler terminated 
both projects. The world was soon to be at peace, at least so it seemed, and there was no 
immediate need to replace a good weapon with one that was only marginally better. 
 Around the time that Army Ordnance was mulling over the idea of improving the 
Garand in the T20 and T22 projects, it became apparent that the standard .30 M2 cartridge 
had reached a state of obsolescence as well. The Second World War presented the officials in 
Army Ordnance with a rather precarious balancing act of research and development and 
production. During the war, there were advances in the applied science of propellants, just as 
in many other fields. The new “Ball Powder9”, so named because of the spherical shape of 
the individual grains, was more efficient than the older propellants then in use for cartridges. 
Because this powder was more efficient than the older powders then in use, it resulted in both 
a problem and an opportunity in the eyes of Army Ordnance and Col. Studler. The Frankford 
Arsenal, found that if the new ball powders were loaded in the standard .30M2 cases, it did 
not fill the case completely, resulting in a large air gap. When Frankford Arsenal test fired 
the cartridges, this situation of excess space in the cartridge cases caused greater than normal 
ballistic deviation10. The seemingly obvious solution to add more powder to the charge was 
                                                 
6
 An autoloading firearm that requires a separate pull on the trigger for each shot to be fired.   
7
 A firearm's ability to alter the rate of fire. The most common choices are semi-automatic, burst, and full 
automatic fire.   
8
 A removable container for holding ammunition that may be in the shape of a straight or curved rectangle. The 
ammunition is forced upwards by a spring and follower, though the ammunition is held inside by the feed lips 
until stripped by the bolt during the cycling of the action.   
9
 This is a trade name for a double-base smokeless powder developed by Olin Industries. The grains have a 
spherical or flattened spherical shape.    
10
 Stevens, R. Blake. U.S. Rifle: From John Garand to the M21.(Toronto: Collector  Grade Publications 1991), 
93 
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not feasible. While the M1 Garand was in most cases immensely durable, it possessed a weak 
link in its gas-operated piston. The operating rod, which doubles as a piston, stretches for 
nearly 30 inches with a dogleg at its mid section. The long, unsupported rod was prone to 
bend when firing heavier charges and bullets in the rifle. Both of these factors created a spike 
in pressure, which bent the operating rod, freezing up the weapon and making it useless.  
 By this time, Army Ordnance was well aware of the reduced length cartridges that 
German armed forces adopted during the Second World War in an attempt to create an 
effective cartridge while reducing the materials used in each round of ammunition. The new 
ball powder would allow the United States to do the same thing, but unlike the Germans, 
without sacrificing any performance11. Army Ordnance slated the .30 M2 cartridge for 
replacement at wars end by a cartridge of the same power, but with a reduced length of about 
half an inch12. This would consume less critical materials, such as brass, per cartridge. It 
would stretch supplies on the producer end, but also allow the average soldier to carry more 
rounds of ammunition per pound. However, research on this new cartridge, named the T65, 
received a low priority until the war ended13.  
 It was at this time that Col. Studler began to think about replacing the M1 Garand 
design with something completely different. The Garand would not be well suited to the new 
cartridge, and a lengthy conversion process would still not rid the Garand rifle of its 
disturbing idiosyncrasies.  In April 1945, Col. Studler summoned a small group of special 
weapons designers to a meeting. The first participant was K.J. Lowe, a designer from the 
                                                 
11
 Stevens, R. Blake. U.S. Rifle: From John Garand to the M21. 92 
12
 Ibid. 93 
13
 Ibid. 93 
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Remington Arms Corporation working on the T22 project at the time14. During the war, arms 
production had inundated the large government arsenals, so firms like Remington often 
received government contracts to produce these experimental prototypes in small numbers. 
This formed a tight relationship between that company and the top levels of Army Ordnance, 
and hence Remington was to be included in new developments as well. Lowe recorded the 
meeting, which took place on April 6, 1945 at Col. Studler’s office.  
 At this meeting, Col. Studler introduced K.J. Lowe to a man named Earle Harvey, a 
young designer at Springfield Armory. Harvey had consulted with Col. Studler recently and 
the two had agreed to build and develop a new rifle based on Harvey’s designs. The design, 
designated T25, would work in a principle similar to the current Browning automatic rifle, 
but the T25 would be a new standard issue rifle15. It was to chamber the newly developed 
T65 30 caliber cartridge, use a box magazine, and weigh seven pounds16. Lowe carefully 
evaluated the new idea at its current point of progress, which he deemed worthy of further 
development. Col. Studler then offered Remington Arms a $46,000 contract for Remington 
to design, test, and refine one working prototype. This prospect was most attractive for 
Remington since the T25, unlike the M1 Garand, did not need any specialty machinery to 
manufacture. Harvey designed it for economy and ease of manufacture. Springfield Armory 
had learned a lesson after the massive issues it experienced in getting Winchester Arms 
Corporation equipped and tooled up to produce their large M1 Garand production order 
earlier in the Second World War. This was the beginning of what was to become a long and 
                                                 
14
 Ibid. 93 
15
 Ibid. 97 
16
 Ibid. 97 
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arduous project to replace the M1 Garand. It was the beginning of the Lightweight Rifle 
Project.  
 
 In 1950, the Cold War was materializing and escalating. The rise of a new open 
conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States and their allies seemed a distinct 
possibility. Col. Studler, still in command of Army Ordnance Rifle Development, ramped up 
research and development into new rifles that would replace the variety of long arms then in 
use by armed forces of the United States. Studler slated the M1 Garand, M1 and M2 carbine, 
the Browning automatic rifle, and the Thompson and M3 sub-machine guns for replacement 
by a single rifle. The criteria for the Light Rifle Project were that the rifle be in 30 caliber, 
weigh seven pounds, have select fire capability, and performance equal to the M1 Garand 
and its cartridge17.  Several government designers began to work on rifles to meet these 
requirements. However, as the United States and its allies formed the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) 1949, there was about to be a showdown between allies over rifle 
development, procurement, and NATO standardization.  
 During the summer of 1950, the recent American developments underwent testing at 
the International Rifle and Ammunition Standardization Trials at the Aberdeen proving 
grounds and Fort Benning, Georgia.18. The entire NATO testing project was under the 
supervision of the Chief of Army Ordnance Rifle Development, Col. Rene Studler. Teams of 
arms designers from Canada, the U.K., Belgium, and the United States gathered to evaluate 
the performance of three rifle platforms and two new cartridges. The United Kingdom’s 
                                                 
17
 McNaugher, Thomas L. Marksmanship, McNamara, and the M16 Rifle: Organization, Analysis, and 
Weapons Acquisition. (Rand Paper Series 1979). 13 
18
 Ezell, Edward and R. Blake Stevens. The Black Rifle: M16 Retrospective. (Toronto: Collector Grade 
Publications 1987). 3 
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Armament Design Establishment submitted their EM-2 rifle, a bull pup19 configuration in 
their newly created .280 caliber intermediate cartridge20. The Belgian government offered its 
FAL,  the Fusil Automatique Leger, or Automatic Light Rifle, designed by the firm Fabrique 
National d’Armes de Guere in the British .280 cartridge21. The American entry was the result 
of the five year long Light Rifle Project, the T25 rifle prototype designed by Earle Harvey of 
Springfield Armory in the newly developed and finalized 30 caliber T65 cartridge22. All three 
entries were not fully developed and still in the experimental stage. All the rifles went 
through accuracy, reliability, durability, and lethality tests.  The testers declared that no rifle 
was fit for adoption at that time. However, the American entry was the least preferred by the 
Infantry User Board at Fort Benning. The Belgian FN-FAL was the most reliable and most 
preferred by the testers23. Testers liked some the compact nature of the British design, but the 
bull pup platform was not very appealing to the users. The .280 British cartridge that the FAL 
and the EM-2 fired was deemed only acceptable in terms of lethality, but was highly praised 
for the low recoil that it generated, since this resulted in faster target acquisition on follow up 
shots in semi-automatic mode, as well as more control in fully-automatic24 mode. The fact 
that the American submission came in last in every aspect except trajectory and long-range 
lethality enraged Col. Studler, who thereafter became more personally involved in the 
development of an American rifle25.  
                                                 
19
 A type of compact rifle characterized by the location of the action. In a bull pup, the action/ejection port is 
located in the area normally occupied by the solid stock of a traditional rifle. 
20
 A medium powered military cartridge capable of controlled automatic fire, but designed for use in a full-sized 
rifle. 
21
 Ezell, Edward and R. Blake Stevens. The Black Rifle: M16 Retrospective. 3 
22
 Ibid. 3 
23
 Stevens, Blake R. The FAL Rifle 35 
24
 With a single, continuous pressure on the trigger, the ability to continuously fire 
25
 Ezell, Edward and R. Blake Stevens. The Black Rifle: M16 Retrospective. 4 
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 From the moment Earle Harvey’s T25 came in last place in the user tests, its fate was 
ultimately sealed.  Although development on the T25 did continue, it lost high priority status. 
Col. Studler threw his weight behind other rifle platforms. The idea was now to base a rifle 
design around the battle proven M1 Garand. Compared to the old M1 Garand, the new 
British and Belgian guns were unreliable and inaccurate. The Garand had several intrinsic 
merits, as it was almost indestructible, a fact proven when it underwent extensive testing in 
the 1930’s. The testers back then could not destroy the M1 Garand beyond repair, even by 
shooting grossly overloaded .30 M2 ammunition in it26.  John Garand, even though close to 
retirement, returned to the project in 1950 to continue where he had left off in 1945 with his 
T20 and T22 designs. Another Springfield Armory Engineer named Lloyd Corbett began 
working on another Garand based project, the T37.  After the 1950 tests, the Ordnance 
Department noticeably and increasingly became more recalcitrant in its mentality, trying to 
be modern while sticking with and modifying older battle and time proven designs and ideas. 
At the same time, the demands placed on these weapons development projects were 
completely unrealistic.  
 It seems that after the failure of the five-year T25 program at the 1950 series of tests, 
the top officials in the United States Army Ordnance Department became militantly 
conservative, relying on tradition as the guide for future development. These leaders ignored 
the experience of U.S. allies and enemies in the close confines of urban warfare during the 
Second World War, as well as most of America’s own fighting experience during the war 
outside of Western Europe. The American forces in Western Europe had often fought in the 
open spaces of the Northern European Plain, a situation favoring long distance combat 
                                                 
26
 Hatcher, Julian. The Book of the Garand.,162 
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shooting. However, the mountainous terrain of the Italian campaign shows that most combat 
was at short-range, and that soldiers preferred their short-range sub-machine guns to their 
long-range M1 Garand rifles because they offered better mobility, ability to carry more 
ammunition, and a higher rate of fire27. Similar patterns of weapon use appeared in the 
Pacific theatre of operations, with the dense jungle of the South Pacific not allowing the open 
spaces in which long-range rifles tended to show their maximum effectiveness28.  
 Colonel Rene Studler, Chief of Army Ordnance Rifle Development from the mid 
1930’s onward, was specifically interested in German developments during the Second 
World War. He examined German weapons and cartridges, but chose to ignore the rationale 
that came from the long experiences of the German combat forces that had originally spurred 
their development and deployment.  The German armaments industry had raised the use of 
simple sheet metal stampings to a high art during the war, as well as the integration of 
lightweight synthetic materials in firearms. Yet Col. Studler was only interested in the 8mm 
Kurz cartridge that the German StG44 fired. A cartridge of reduced size would not only use 
less material, but would help in making the fully-automatic rifle a more feasible idea by 
reducing the distance the moving parts would have to cycle. Yet he was more unwilling in 
1950 than in 1945 to settle for the reduced performance of the intermediate German round, 
for the same reasons as his lack of interest in the Bakelite and stamped steel construction of 
the German weapons. He saw both as a sign of crude desperation in the face of allied 
bombing and lack of raw materials29. Studler believed the Germans had stumbled on a single 
good idea of the intermediate cartridge out of their desperation, and that Army Ordnance was 
                                                 
27
 McNaugher, Thomas L. Marksmanship, McNamara, and the M16 Rifle: Organization, Analysis, and 
Weapons Acquisition. 16 
28
 Ibid. 16 
29
 Ibid. 16 
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actualizing the concept by using new ball powder propellants. Studler’s devotion to a full 
powered round continued to intensify with his irritation after the 1950 trials. At that point, 
the United States Army, taking Studler’s advice, released the following statement. “The Army 
is firmly opposed to the adoption of any less effective small caliber cartridge for use in either 
its present rifle, or in the new weapons being developed.”30 The T65 cartridge was the 
cartridge the Army experts were backing, calling it an intermediate cartridge because of its 
reduced overall length. Studler had employed the new and more efficient ball powder and 
used the commercial 300 Savage cartridge case to shorten the .30 M2 cartridges from 63 
millimeters to 51 millimeters. These changes gave identical performance to the current 
service cartridge, but saved weight and materials31 However, the new cartridge proved more 
difficult to make reliable. Compared to the old .30M2 cartridge, the new T65 cartridge had 
less taper in its profile in the interest of creating an efficient casing to best utilize the new 
propellants. Due to its redesigned, less tapered shape, it was more difficult to get the rifles to 
feed the ammunition cartridge reliably and extract an empty casing32. The lower rank and 
younger officials in Army Ordnance began to think this direction of cartridge design was not 
the correct path to follow. Looking at the realities of World War II combat experience, these 
men began looking more into newer, smaller calibers and ballistics theories, setting the stage 
for an internal struggle. To add to this, the pressing nature of NATO standardization would 
bring increased pressure on the large national powers to develop and acquire a standard arm 
in a standard caliber for all member nations to use.   
                                                 
30
 Stevens, Blake R. The FAL Rifle., 35 
31
 Ezell, Edward and R. Blake Stevens. The Black Rifle: M16 Retrospective. 3 
32
 Ibid. 3 
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 Just as the international rifle trials of 1950 were winding down, the Army of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea crossed the South Korean border with a large 
invasion force. As the Army of the Republic of Korea and United Nations forces reeled under 
the onslaught, S.L.A Marshall, a historian for the Operations Research Office (a civilian 
branch of Johns Hopkins University) working for the Ordnance Department under Project 
Doughboy traveled to the area to debrief and interview the soldiers of the United States 
Eighth Army33. Marshall gathered a detailed study of rifle performance and effectiveness in 
the first conflict since the Second World War. Marshall published his 142-page report 
Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea the following year, in 
195134. Marshall’s findings and commentary flew in the face of the traditional method of 
Army marksmanship training, as well as undermining top American military leaders’ opinion 
of the usefulness of long-range rifle fire. The timing of the Marshall investigation could not 
have been at a more opportune time, since 1950 saw the greatest use of infantry small arms 
as the primary weapon of warfare35.  
 Marshall’s study revealed some characteristics of the American military rifleman and 
his weapons that were less than flattering. Marshall drew upon his earlier work Men Against 
Fire, a study on rifle fire during the Second World War. Marshall stated that several patterns 
he first documented in World War II repeated themselves in Korea. However, due to the lack 
of armored fighting vehicles on the Korean frontlines in 1950, the patterns caused more 
problems in executing the war effectively. Marshall noticed that in Korea, just as in the 
Second World War, an average of 75% of American combat infantrymen had failed to 
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persistently fire on the enemy36. He compared this to the days of musketry when evidence 
suggested that up to 66% of troops would fire on the enemy37. The fighting man of World 
War II and Korea was paling in comparison with the fighting man of the past in his ability to 
engage the opponent. Moreover, this damning evidence only considered the ability to get 
infantrymen to fire their rifles, nothing to do with actual accuracy of fire.  
 Marshall saved his findings and opinions on rifle accuracy for another section, where 
his data showed the training and the ideology behind top military leaders’ emphasis on 
precision long-range rifle fire to be just rhetoric, which bore little resemblance to practice in 
modern war. During his time in Korea, Marshall states that at no time did he witness decisive 
and damaging rifle fire coming from the American or Korean troops past 200 yards38. Add to 
this the fact that U.S troops gained or lost the most land in intense firefights at or below 150 
yards, and the picture became blatantly clear for Marshall39. Modern warfare for Marshall 
was about achieving a high volume of fire at short to medium distances, not about long 
distance precision rifle fire. Riflemen could only perform reliably at these short to medium 
ranges, if they would fire at all. Even the Marines, an institution that prided itself in long-
range marksmanship, did not escape Marshall’s analysis. Citing a specific case when 
marksmanship would have been an asset, Marshall proceeded to reveal the inability of the 
average Marine to fire accurately at the siege of Koto-ri in December 195040. At this siege, 
Marines failed to accurately fire upon and hit fully exposed enemy soldiers at 300-350 yards. 
Despite the fact that Marines received 250% more marksmanship training on the same 
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weapons as the Army, a full 38% of their boot camp experience, they still could not shoot 
any better41.  
 Marshall noticed several deficiencies in the existing arms of the American fighting 
man and offered some remedies to help maximize the rate, accuracy, and lethality of rifle fire 
in Korea. The weapon system most loathed by both Marshall and the troops on the ground 
was the M1 and M2 carbines. Winchester Arms had developed the M1 carbine, and rushed it 
into production when the U.S. entered World War II to arm rear echelon personnel with 
something better than a pistol. The M1 carbine was faster and easier to produce compared to 
the Garand, and much cheaper than the Thompson sub-machine gun, and thus found its way 
to the front lines out of necessity.  It was initially semi-automatic only, and fired a small .30 
caliber cartridge from a detachable 15 round magazine42. The M2 was a post World War II 
modification to the same gun, making it into select fire version. While the M1 carbine 
appeared to perform well in the Second World War, it became considered as the least reliable 
and effective arm in the American arsenal during Korea. Marshall noticed that the M2 
carbine worked especially poorly in the cold climate of Korean winters, operating sluggishly 
from the effects of cold and frost. The M2 would often fail to fire fully automatic unless 
warmed up by firing anywhere from five to twenty shots43.  During the opposite conditions in 
the summer, the M2 failed due to dust and moisture44. For some reason, the older semi-
automatic M1 carbines were less sensitive to the elements, but still performed worse than all 
other arms except the M2. Marshall blamed the design, which still lacked refinement after 
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Winchester Arms and Army Ordnance rushed it into production. In addition to a lack of 
refinement, Marshall also pointed to the magazines and ammunition for the failures. The 
rusty magazines and corroded ammunition resulting from exposure to the elements also 
caused the weapons to fail45. The total weapons failure in the Korean War during this period 
averaged around 9%, and the carbines accounted for the majority of these malfunctions46. 
Even when the carbines did work, Marshall commented that they still lacked sufficient 
power, and in fully automatic mode they lacked accuracy47. Even when all factors favored 
successful operation by the infantryman, the carbines only had good terminal efficiency out 
to 50 yards48.  
 Marshall praised the M1 Garand as an alternative that would be accurate, resistant to 
damage from winter and summer in Korea, and reliable given minimum care49. Marshall 
therefore recommended the M1 Garand as an immediate replacement for the M1 and M2 
carbines. However, since most men did not fire persistently in combat, the semi-automatic 
Garand could not fill the needs of the Army. Only by adding another Browning automatic 
rifle or Browning machine gun per squad, could the effective ranges of the infantry extend to 
around 400 yards50. However, Marshall stated that even so, would be a limit to the 
effectiveness the weapons can supply due to the ammunition they fire. The .30 M2 cartridge 
was large and heavy. With a length of 62mm, it was almost twice as heavy and as large as the 
ammunition fired in the M1 and M2 carbines. The size of the cartridge limited the 
ammunition capacity of the M1 Garand and Browning automatic rifle, with the Garand 
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holding only eight cartridges per clip and the Browning automatic rifle holding 20 per 
magazine. The Garand required frequent reloading during rapid and severe firefights. 
However, the weight of the ammunition severely limited the number of cartridges the 
average soldier could carry51. The standard issue of ammunition for a Garand supplied 
soldier was 100 cartridges. In a fierce firefight, the ammunition can disappear fast and 
running out of ammunition was a distinct possibility. This was not a problem when the 
.30M2 cartridge was created for the slow firing bolt action 1903 Springfield rifle, but the 
arrival of the autoloading weapon caused ammunition consumption to raise dramatically. 
Already carrying 40 pounds of gear, the average soldier could not carry as much ammunition 
as required52. Even if the ammunition was available in significant numbers, the .30M2 and 
even the intermediate .30 carbine ammunition made the weapons hard to control in rapid fire 
and completely uncontrollable in fully automatic fire, due to the weight of the projectile they 
fired53.  
 The answer to the reality of Korean War performance flaws for the U.S. Army and 
Marines was to increase the emphasis on marksmanship in basic training. Marshall found his 
study largely dismissed or ignored by the top officials in Army Ordnance, who thought that 
the T65 cartridge was still the answer. They focused on the T65 cartridge’s more compact 
and light nature, compared to the .30 M2. The shining review of the M1 Garand rifle in the 
Marshall study only bolstered attempts to use the Garand as a basis and indeed the standard 
to measure all other prototypes in the areas of durability, reliability, accuracy, and lethality. 
They failed to address the problem of controllability in a .30 caliber select fire weapon 
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operating in fully automatic mode. If the weak .30 carbine cartridge gave users control 
problems in the light M2 carbines, how would the much more powerful T65 cartridge fare in 
a rifle of comparable weight? Top officials did not address the issue and still chose to pursue 
the Light Rifle Project and the T65 cartridge. The British were still developing their EM-2 
and .280 cartridge. The multi national force strained logistics in the Korean War due to the 
varying equipment of member armies comprising the United Nations forces. NATO needed 
standardized equipment quickly, and many member nations increased pressure for 
standardization after the start of the Korean War. This standardization issue set up the 
controversy that almost destroyed the long held and strong Anglo-American alliance during 
1950-1954.  
 The war in Korea had revealed what the NATO planners had feared, an equipment 
supply crunch. NATO had made some progress in measurement standards, allowing for some 
parts inter-compatibility on vehicles, but one of the most pressing issues was fast becoming 
the lack of a standard cartridge and rifle.  By this time there were 400,000 NATO troops 
comprised of 11 armies with 11 different rifles in a multitude of calibers54.  At this time, the 
once solid Anglo- American alliance was beginning to show signs of strain. Both nations had 
a long history of government run ordnance departments and arsenals. Both had seen the 
vicious nature of combat in the Second World War and taken away different lessons from it. 
Out of these lessons came the very different British EM-2 and American T25 with their 
respective different types of cartridges. Over the years of 1951-1954, it appeared that this 
difference was impassible for the two allies, and very nearly caused the alliance to break into 
a cold hostility.  
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 The British government had been using variations of the Lee Enfield rifle since 1902, 
and the British were eager to replace the long lasting veteran design55. The British had been 
looking into the idea of the self-loading rifle since before the First World War. Just as the 
Americans noticed the World War II German developments of the intermediate cartridge and 
weapons manufacture, the British were also paying careful attention. At the end of the war, 
with emphasis returning to research and development, the British Ministry of Supply 
instituted the Small Arms Ideal Calibre Panel56. The British, looking at more than just 
performance of singular components of a weapons system, considered all components 
together. The goal of the panel was to create the lightest rifle and ammunition combination 
consistent with firing comfort and effectiveness at the lowered range of 600 meters57. The 
developmental team realized that the old mentality of British marksmanship, dating back to 
their experience in the Boer Wars, was outdated when one panel member said, “it was 
recognized that the old .303 over killed at rifle range”58. The result of the panel’s work was 
the .280 intermediate cartridge.  
 It is quite odd that two close allies such as the United Kingdom and the United States, 
which had co-operated in the Second World War in arms development, would be at odds on 
something as basic and necessary as the infantry rifle. British Brigadier General Aubrey 
Dixon commented that the sudden lack of cooperation between the two nations was probably 
rooted in the American fear of communist influence in the Liberal Labour government under 
Clement Atlee. Regardless of the cause, U.S. Army Ordnance was very secretive about their 
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plans to develop a .30 caliber lightweight rifle, which forced the British to go their own path. 
At first there appears to have been some resentment, if the feeling of Brigadier General 
Dixon were representative of the British military, but afterwards the pursuit of a new rifle 
and cartridge became a matter of national pride.  
 In April of 1951, less than a year after the initial testing for a NATO rifle took place, 
the British Defense Minister Emanuel Shinwell announced the full development and 
adoption of the British EM-2 and its .280 intermediate by the United Kingdom to replace the 
aged Lee Enfield bolt-action rifle59. Not only did this throw the future of standardization in 
peril, but also the British government began to split along party lines. The announcement of 
the adoption caused a long and heated debate between the Conservative and Labour members 
of Parliament. The Conservatives wanted the government to work with America to adopt a 
common rifle and cartridge, while the Labour ministers continued to press for the EM-260. It 
looked as if the situation amongst the NATO members was deadlocked, with no side willing 
to give in to the other. It was at this point that the Canadian government stepped in to 
mediate. The idea of Canada, a large producer of ammunition, supplying a third caliber to the 
allied forces in Korea would overwhelm the already strained logistical situation.  
 The Canadian Minister of Defense called a meeting for August 1, 1951 in 
Washington DC61. The four-power conference included defense and ordnance officials from 
Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. From the moment the 
conference began, it appeared that the American officials were putting all efforts into killing 
the .280 British round as a possible NATO standard. They presented a barrage of data and 
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facts to present their case, to which the British Defense Minister Shinwell could not respond 
with data of his own. American officials presented their research data to the Canadian and 
French allies to suggest the inadequate performance of the.280 British cartridge compared to 
the American T65 cartridge62. American officials also argued that the British EM-2 was 
prone to breaking and its optical sight subject to damage and fogging63. Against this, the 
British argued that their intermediate round would be economically smart due to the reduced 
materials consumed. However, the American board countered again, saying that their T65 
represented a savings as well. The American officials also argued that since three of the four 
major allies already were producing 30 caliber cartridges, it would be cheaper to adopt the 
T65 as it would only require modifications to existing equipment, not total replacement64. 
The American officials also said that the cost of retooling American arsenals to a 28 caliber 
rounds would be too much for the Congress to approve. While this was unlikely given the 
willingness of Congress to approve more expensive and less basic measures, the point 
seemed to convince the French delegation to side with the Americans. This effectively 
deadlocked the conference, as the British ministers refused to concede. At the begging of the 
Canadian officials, they merely agreed to postpone deployment of the new British rifle until 
the Korean conflict ended65.  
 On October 25, 1951, the Conservative Party won the British elections. Winston 
Churchill, again prime minister, soon made his opinion clear on the matter. He said that he 
was far from convinced about the merits of the EM-2 and the .280 intermediate cartridge it 
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fired66. Churchill brought the political reality of the EM-2 adoption into the discussion, citing 
the small annual rate of arms production in Britain compared to other nations. Churchill 
noted that given the poor economic situation of the nation in the wake of the Second World 
War, expanding the arms sector would be difficult67. Britain, according to Churchill, could 
not go it alone in the world anymore. While the EM-2 rifle and its cartridge might seem to be 
the best in the national context, pushing this design in the international context was probably 
not practical.  
 Less than a year later, on November 5, 1952, Prime Minister Churchill met with U.S. 
President Harry Truman. After three days of talks on mutual defense issues, they announced 
that they had seen eye to eye on a number of issues, one of which was rifle standardization68. 
It appears that the Conservative British government, eager to claim a high position for its 
naval commanders in the NATO alliance, dropped its insistence on the adoption of the EM-2 
and the .280 intermediate cartridge. British naval commanders in return received high 
positions in NATO, even though Britain’s naval forces now paled in comparison to the 
United States, and they shifted focus and development towards the Belgian designed FAL 
rifle69. In February 1953, with British backing, the T65 cartridge became the new 7.62 
NATO round and a year later, the Belgian FAL rifle became the new British rifle70. Labour 
members of Parliament such as Woodrow Wyatt railed against Churchill and the 
Conservatives for “Betraying the U.K” and relying on the Belgians for rifles, given the fact 
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Belgium was the first country over run in the last two great wars71. Churchill engineered the 
Compromise of 1954 as a concession on standardization. Churchill hoped that the 
Americans, more friendly toward the Belgian FAL, would sanction it as the NATO rifle, if 
the British sanctioned the American T65 cartridge72. The rifle situation would drag on 
another three years before America would back out of the Churchill compromise, but by that 
time NATO standardization was a failure. The issue that was three years earlier almost 
responsible for shattering the Anglo-American friendship was now a minor issue.  
 From 1950-1954, the American government, acting on the advice of United States 
Army Ordnance, had been successful in getting its intermediate in size only cartridge, the 
T65, designated as the new standard NATO cartridge for small arms. Along the way it had 
also killed off the very strong efforts of its chief ally, Great Britain, to get its EM-2 rifle and 
true intermediate cartridge, the .280 British, adopted. The shocking defeat of the American 
T25 rifle in the 1950 international light rifle trials by the British EM-2 and Belgian FAL 
cemented the traditionalist tendencies of Army Ordnance and specifically its leadership 
concerning small arms development. The tradition of long-range precision marksmanship, 
dating back at least as far as the Spanish American War, continued to hold sway over senior 
American ordnance officers. Even the scientific studies of the Operations Research Office of 
Johns Hopkins University, showing the Korean War reality incompatible with long-range 
marksmanship, were unable to convince people like Col. Rene Studler that the traditional 
training and ideology of the United States Army and Marines had become obsolescent.  
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 U.S. Ordnance officials stuck to their conservative principles on marksmanship and 
weaponry, causing a nearly tragic rift between allies of the NATO alliance, and injected 
nationalism into the efforts for standardization. As the attempts to standardize the most basic 
of weapons, the infantry rifle, failed, so did the efforts to standardize more sophisticated 
weapons such as planes, tanks, and other vehicles. No country was particularly willing from 
1950-1953 to admit that a foreign ally’s design was better than the domestically produced 
counterpart was. Even the attempt to fix the situation by Winston Churchill in 1953-1954 had 
little effect on the overall situation. His adoption of the Belgian FAL and the American T65 
cartridge did little to fix the failed attempts at standardization. American officials, less 
critical of the FAL, still did not earnestly wish to adopt it, and continued to go their own 
course to adopt a domestic design. The officials at Army Ordnance had preserved their power 
from foreign intrusion. However, the domestic commercial market and lower government 
officials were eager to enter the competition for future weapons development against the 
current government designs. World War II had shown that commercial ideas could gain 
government acceptance, as the Winchester designed M1 and M2 carbines had, and that these 
endeavors were immensely profitable. In addition, younger officials in ordnance became 
interested in new ballistic theories as the potential solution to problems present since the 
Second World War, as made apparent by the Korean study conducted by S.L.A. Marshall.  
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Domestic Challenges to the Light Rifle Project  
 With the second round of light rifle trials in 1952 completed and the Harvey T25/T47 
projects terminated, the United States Army Ordnance threw what was left of its funding and 
efforts (greatly diminished by the seven-year long Harvey program) into the Garand-based 
T44 project of Lloyd Corbett, a designer at Springfield Armory. This project, in development 
only since 1950 and based on the earlier efforts of the World War II Garand T20 project, had 
fielded a rifle that performed extremely well, where the Harvey T25/T47 projects and the 
Belgian FAL did not. On the measure of reliability in extreme conditions, the T44 Garand 
based rifle outperformed the Belgian and Harvey rifles by a significant margin. While the 
FAL and Harvey guns malfunctioned and jammed in dusty and arctic environments, the T44 
fared much better. The advantages of the T44 allowed Army Ordnance to resist ongoing 
pressure from the Belgians and British to adopt the FAL, with the U.S. continuing on an 
independent path of development. Due to previous World War II development projects, the 
T44 offered an alternative to the ailing Harvey project that was compatible with the small 
remaining budget. However, even as the officials in Army Ordnance defended their projects 
against challenges from the British and Belgians, a new domestic firm, Armalite, submitted a 
new rifle platform to compete against the government sponsored Light Rifle Project.  
 Armalite began as a small offshoot of Fairchild Engine and Aircraft of Hagerstown, 
Maryland, originating from an interesting 1953 meeting between a Fairchild executive and 
John Sullivan of Lockheed Aircraft73.  At this meeting, the discussion of arms development 
arose. John Sullivan mentioned that he had learned of several new advancements in arms 
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design and production from J.S. Michault, an arms broker for Sidem International of 
Belgium. Back in 1950, the United States had undertaken to arm the new West German 
Border Police with weapons and had chartered Sidem International to fulfill the contract. 
Michault, in charge of this program, met Col. Rene Studler of U.S. Army Ordnance74. Studler 
briefed Michault about World War II German developments in the manufacture of arms, 
information which Studler himself chose to ignore, but which Michault embraced.  This 
briefing filtered down to George Sullivan and finally to the Fairchild executives75, who 
concluded that newly developed materials, such as stronger aluminum alloys and fiberglass, 
might replace German methods of steel stampings and Bakelite plastics. Use of these new 
materials, already common in the aircraft industry, could create inexpensive, reliable, and 
above all, light rifles, Fairchild believed.  
 These discussions continued for some time until Richard Boutelle, president of 
Fairchild Aircraft, formed Armalite on October 1, 1954. Boutelle hired George Sullivan as 
president of the newly formed California division of Fairchild and placed him in charge of 
arms development using these new materials76. Sullivan brought along his brother in law, 
Charles Dorchester, to become the plant manager. Dorchester had already been using 
materials such as anodized77 aluminum alloys, stainless steel, and foam filled plastics and 
fiberglass to design lightweight bolt-action weapons that were nearly immune to corrosion by 
the elements. Once these designs attained reliability, Fairchild hoped to sell production 
licenses to manufacturers, rather than spending the capital to set up a mass production line. 
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Dorchester and Sullivan hired a former Marine and low-level Army Ordnance technician, 
Eugene M. Stoner, as their chief engineer, who developed full plans for autoloading rifles 
that could utilize these new materials and processes. Stoner’s design for the new AR-3 rifle 
was conventional in layout and style, looking much like an aluminum and plastic hunting 
rifle. However, it provided a viable testing platform from which the engineers learned much 
they later applied to later designs78.  
  Eugene Stoner was quite receptive to the use of new materials in his designs, but in 
fact, little of his actual design features themselves were new. The patent awarded to Stoner 
for his gas operation showed how much he took much from previous European and American 
firearms. Stoner’s method by which the reciprocating parts locked into place had roots in the 
1930’s era Johnson automatic rifle.  Melvin Johnson, the rifle’s designer, had marketed his 
rifle unsuccessfully as a challenger to the M1 Garand before World War II. Stoner adopted 
this Johnson locking design, in which a multiple lugged bolt locks into a barrel extension, 
rather than into the receiver like a traditional rifle such as the Garand79. However, Stoner 
created a mode that reciprocates the bolt and bolt carrier which was different from Johnson’s 
automatic rifle. In the Johnson automatic rifle, the action cycles through the short recoil 
principle, where the kinetic energy of the fired cartridge, the recoil impulse, reciprocates the 
parts and ejects a fired cartridge casing80.  The Stoner rifle used a gas-operated system. Since 
the turn of the century, many nations had already utilized this system of operation; however, 
Stoner chose an unpopular variation, the direct gas impingement system.  
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 In the direct gas impingement system of operation, gas is directly tapped from the 
barrel of the weapon, directed via a tube backwards into the receiver where it generates a 
pneumatic force against the bolt or bolt carrier, unlocking the bolt and using the residual 
force to propel the bolt carrier assembly rearwards, ejecting the spent cartridge casing81. A 
recoil spring then halts and returns the carrier assembly forward to reload the rifle with a 
fresh cartridge. The French MAS 49 rifle, as well as the Swedish Ljungman Gevar 42 rifle, 
had also employed this feature several years earlier82. Direct gas impingement previously 
saw such selected service because it directed propellant residue into the action of the rifle, 
causing extra fouling of the action. Stoner utilized this system because it required less parts 
than traditional gas operated systems such as on the M1 Garand and Belgian FAL, which 
used operating rods and pistons to transfer the pneumatic pulse to the receiver and 
reciprocating parts. A design having fewer parts provided several advantages; there was less 
to fail and less to manufacture. The choice of this method allowed for a more cost effective 
rifle that weighed less, perhaps most important feature to any rifle competing against Army 
Ordnance’s Light Rifle Project. 
 Armalite’s resulting military oriented prototypes were the first AR-10 rifles, 
completed in 1955, which chambered first the old .30M2 cartridge and the then new 7.62 
NATO cartridge. Both of these featured stocks that allowed for a straight line of recoil and 
were tubular in shape. They also featured high profile sights necessitated by straight-line 
recoil, just as in the Johnson automatic rifles models of 1941 and 1944. The Stoner and 
Johnson connection evolved into direct cooperation by 1955, when Melvin Johnson joined 
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Armalite as a consultant and publicist, leaving his consultant positions at Winchester Arms 
and the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University83. Johnson repeatedly hailed 
the new Stoner AR-10 rifles for taking full advantage of his idea of locking the bolt to a 
barrel extension. Since the stress of firing in this system is localized to the barrel extension 
and barrel, this allowed Stoner to fabricate both the large upper receiver (containing the 
weapon’s action), as well as the lower receiver (containing the trigger mechanism) out of 
lightweight aluminum alloys instead of heavy steel forgings.  
 Armalite’s building of the first two functional AR-10 rifles led to further 
developments on the platform. The third prototype AR-10A included the first use of 
fiberglass reinforced plastic shells filled with plastic foam for the stock, pistol grip, and hand 
guards. Stoner also attached at the muzzle an effective duralumin noise and flash 
suppressor84. Eugene Stoner, George Sullivan, and retired General Jacob Devers submitted 
this AR-10A prototype to the Infantry User Board at Fort Benning in December 1955. 
Armalite demonstrated the rifles in 1956 and they performed well before a number of 
officials, including the Continental Army Command Headquarters at Fort Monroe, 
Virginia85. The resulting tests gave the AR-10A a boost that Armalite needed to try to catch 
up to the T44 project. Continental Army Command approved the Infantry Board’s 
recommendation to instruct Ordnance Research and Development to investigate the possible 
military applications of the Armalite design. In summer 1956, Ordnance Research and 
Development offered to send the Armalite design team the information learned from Project 
SALVO, so Armalite could investigate the possibility of creating a rugged and light weapon 
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system designed to utilize Small Caliber High velocity ammunition. Army Ordnance offered 
Armalite direct financial support for future company developments, on the condition that the 
ordnance corps owned the rights to the final product86. Armalite refused the offer of financial 
support, hoping instead to profit from further development along current lines. Soon the 
directors of the company announced a large-scale plan for further development of the AR-10 
weapons platform.  
 It was at this point that Fairchild became overly enthusiastic and began to change the 
design to save even more weight. By further reducing weight, the goal was to give the AR-10 
an even greater advantage in testing against the government’s Light Rifle Program. The most 
significant change came in the barrel construction of the fourth variation of the AR-10B, one 
that Eugene Stoner had personally opposed utilizing for safety reasons. The first three 
versions of the AR-10 had utilized traditional ordnance steel barrels, but the fourth prototype 
variation of the AR-10B had a barrel that was a composite of stainless steel and aluminum. 
The barrel consisted of an extremely thin rifled stainless steel barrel liner surrounded by a 
thick aluminum alloy jacketing87.  This was not a new principle in general; Armalite had 
utilized a similar design for their low powered AR-5 bolt-action survival rifle that they were 
marketing to the United States Air Force at the same time88.  
 Armalite delivered a batch of AR-10B fourth variation rifles to Springfield Armory in 
the fall of 1956 for extensive testing, at the request of Continental Army Command.  Lt. Col. 
Roy E. Rayle, then the head of the armory’s Research and Development Division, oversaw 
the testing of the AR-10 rifles and wrote about it in an unpublished document, Growth of a 
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Rifle. Parts of it reproduced in other sources yield insight into the events of that period and 
into the perceptions of the Armalite prototypes by a skilled ordnance officer89. In this study, 
Lt. Col. Rayle examined the barrel, concluding that the design was theoretically feasible and 
worth testing90.  Shortly after the arrival of the rifles, a Mr. Dorchester (presumably Charles 
Dorchester, the plant manager of Armalite) arrived to discuss testing procedures for the AR-
10 rifles91. The officers at Springfield Armory subjected AR-10 rifles to the same tests that 
the American T44 and the Belgian FAL rifles had completed in the past. The only exception 
to the standard testing procedure was that Melvin Johnson, now under the employ of 
Armalite as a consultant, supervised the tests so that Armalite could be sure of fair and 
balanced procedures92.  
 In mid December 1956, the testing stopped after the muzzle brake/ flash suppressors 
failed.  The rifles up to that point had already proved unreliable, as they had suffered broken 
extractors, trigger sear failure, failure to feed ammunition, pierced ammunition primers, and 
warping of the gas tube93. Armalite addressed the failure of the muzzle brake by using 
titanium instead of duralumin, and replaced the stainless steel gas tube with one of ordnance 
steel. Testing resumed the next month, January 1957. One of the two rifles underwent 
durability testing, while the other underwent evaluations on general performance. Early in the 
testing phase, the rifles showed marked improvement. The replacement of the stainless steel 
gas tube with a normal ordnance steel tube fixed the warping issue, and the new titanium 
muzzle device showed marked durability improvement over the earlier duralumin one, 
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although it still fouled after a period and no longer suppressed flash well94.  The rifles tended 
to have feeding and extraction malfunctions in sub zero temperatures, and tended to freeze 
overnight. Although this was not out of the ordinary in testing or in the field, it proved to be 
more difficult to free the AR-10 action due to the layout of the gun. However, after a few 
days, the rifle undergoing durability testing suffered a catastrophic failure. Lt. Col. Rayle 
wrote, “We had not yet reached the most severe part of the test schedule, when a bullet came 
out of the side of the barrel just ahead of the hand of the gunner holding the rifle.95” 
Metallurgists evaluated the guns and concluded that while the stainless steel alloy 416 used 
for the barrel liner would work in a water-cooled machine gun, it did not have enough 
transverse-strength for an air-cooled weapon that operates in a wider temperature range. The 
analysts also determined that the alloy contained too much sulfur, allowing stress cracks to 
form, while the heat treatment used to temper the stainless steel barrel liner was not 
compatible with the liner’s application96.   
 Following the failure of the AR-10B fourth variation rifles, Armalite contacted a 
government contractor that had several T44 barrel blanks. The contractor and Eugene Stoner 
worked together to produce an all steel barrel that was as light as the composite barrel by 
milling large longitudinal grooves down the sides of the barrel. This removed material, but 
also stiffened the barrel, making it light while maintaining its strength at the same time. With 
the new fluted carbon steel barrels installed, the AR-10 rifles finished the trials without 
further catastrophic failures97. However, the rifles exhibited many more malfunctions and 
parts breakages, causing Army Ordnance to declare the AR-10 under-developed and unfit for 
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service. Armalite did not choose to challenge the T44 further and instead chose to focus on 
promoting the AR-10 in foreign military rifle competitions.  
 While it is evident that the AR-10 from Armalite came too late to stop the momentum 
favoring the adoption of the T44 as the U.S. Service Rifle M-14 in May of 1957, it did 
introduce new ideas to the American community of small arms designers at both commercial 
and state armories. While ordnance officials had been leery of radical foreign designs such as 
the British EM-2 and the World War II German developments, the Armalite AR-10 used a 
traditional configuration, unlike the bull pup EM-2. It also used materials that while new to 
small arms, had already become standard in the aircraft industry. The Armalite rifles showed 
artisanship in their forged and milled construction, unlike the crude looking pressed sheet 
metal designs of Germany during the World War II. The innovation in materials and design 
was radical, but not too radical for some ordnance and Army officials. While the Armalite 
AR-10 never presented a serious challenge to the T44 which had a significant head start in 
development, it did make some people in middle management positions in the Army 
Ordnance department, as well as other sections of the military, begin to see the future of 
small arms differently. The Armalite platform was quite feasible; it would just take time for 
the platform to be further developed.
 38
                      Opposition to the Light Rifle Project in the Ordnance Corps 
 There are always two components to a small arms design, the platform and the 
cartridge that it chambers and fires. The Anglo-American rifle controversy of the early 
1950’s was as much about the competition between the T65 cartridge and the .280 British 
cartridge as it was between the platforms that chambered them. While the T65 cartridge was 
the official cartridge sponsored by the United States Army Ordnance officials such as Chief 
of Rifle Development Col. Rene Studler, other officials were concentrating on new concepts 
in cartridges that might be applicable to not only the current crop of small arms, but also to 
any future platforms. While the Europeans had been experimenting since the Second World 
War with intermediate cartridges like the 8mm Kurz and .280 British as an alternative to the 
traditional high power full sized rifle cartridges, cartridge designers in the United States 
chose to focus on the concept of a small caliber high velocity cartridge. Even as the Army 
Ordnance official T65 cartridge battled against challengers from abroad, there were 
challenges from within as well.  From 1950 through 1953, various civilian officials at 
Aberdeen’s Ballistic Research Laboratory and the Operations Research Office of Johns 
Hopkins University challenged the Army’s standard view of modern combat, and designed 
new and original cartridges around this vision.  
 In November 1950, Studler ordered the first detailed and analytical study on the rifle 
effectiveness since the end of Second World War98. His order immediately followed the first 
round of international rifle trials for NATO standardization, which showed the American T25 
Rifle to be inferior to the Belgian FAL and even to the British EM-2 in several areas. Only 
the T65 cartridge allowed the T25 to outperform the foreign designs in range and accuracy. 
                                                 
98
 Ezell, Edward and R. Blake Stevens. The Black Rifle: M16 Retrospective. 7 
 39
Col. Studler may have hoped that a new study on rifle effectiveness would validate his 
conservative view of modern warfare, the view that emphasized long-range marksmanship 
and precision fire at longer distances. The man charged by Col. Studler to undertake the 
study was Donald L. Hall, an engineer at the Aberdeen Ballistics Research Laboratory at the 
Aberdeen Proving Grounds99. Hall’s report of March 1952 did not produce results that the 
upper echelons of Army Ordnance expected or hoped. Hall took data from the international 
rifle trials and the already discussed Korean War combat study by S.L.A. Marshall, and 
designed experimental cartridges around what these revealed as the essential nature of 
modern combat.  
 Opening with an interesting disclaimer, Hall declared “This report was prepared 
without regard to present established military characteristics of the Army Field Forces, since 
the purpose of research is to provide basic data which may assist in developing future 
requirements.100“ Hall took several factors into mind when considering his experimental 
cartridges. These experimental cartridges were theoretical and existed only on paper. They 
were just the results of calculations, not actual experimental firings. The first factor 
considered was the probability that the soldier firing the weapon would be able to hit the 
target. Secondly, Hall investigated what would be the wounding effects if the soldier hit the 
intended target. This required analyzing the shape of the bullet, its mass, and the velocity at 
which it would strike the target. Finally, Hall took into account the combined weight of the 
rifle and ammunition101. Previous studies had analyzed the first two questions as Hall did, as 
had field trials such as the 1950 international rifle trials at Fort Benning. However, Hall’s 
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third focus was new and unique to the study of rifle effectiveness. Hall determined that with 
a combination of rifle and ammunition weighing 15 pounds, a soldier carrying a rifle in .21 
caliber could hypothetically kill around 2.5 times more enemy combatants than could a 
soldier equipped with the M1 Garand rifle and .30M2 ammunition102. The .21 caliber rifle 
offered a higher probability of hitting an intended target, and created less weight, letting each 
solider carry more ammunition. Hall’s analysis assumed ranges of around 120 yards, 
following approximately what S.L.A Marshall had stated as the most common and effective 
range of engagement from his study of the Korean War103. Strongly influenced by Marshall’s 
study of rifle effectiveness in the Korean War, Hall complained that soldiers carrying the M1 
Garand did not have enough ammunition to last in a long firefight104.  
 Hall’s work on theoretical cartridges garnered enough support from others in research 
and development to allow small-scale test firings. Hall conducted his test firings at the Small 
Arms Section of the Aberdeen Ballistics Laboratory’s Development of Proof Services105. The 
resulting data and opinions ended up in the original study as an addendum. Originally, Hall 
was going to test the commercially available 220 Swift round, a popular hunting cartridge for 
small game that at the time was the only comparable cartridge easily obtainable. However, 
Col. Studler allowed Hall to procure .22 caliber bullets like those in his theoretical study, 
ones more closely homologous in shape to the .30M2, having nearly the same, but an 
inferior, ballistic coefficient106. This reduction in the ballistic coefficient of the supplied 
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bullets caused the loaded cartridges to perform with less long-range accuracy and 
penetration. Col. Studler supplied 200 bullets for the experiment, which Hall and his team 
manufactured into complete cartridges using 220 Swift cartridge casings107.  Hall and his 
small team fired the cartridges from a customized Winchester rifle to obtain ballistic, 
accuracy, and penetration data108.  
 The results of the test firings added experimental data that did indeed back up Hall’s 
theoretical cartridges. However, since the bullets fired were not the same shape as the .30M2 
bullets, as the bullets in the theoretical work were, Hall concluded that accuracy and effective 
range diminished about 25%109. For instance, Hall’s penetration tests showed that the normal 
.30M2 cartridge was able to penetrate 10-gauge cold rolled steel completely out to 625 yards 
and partially at 725110. The experimental .220 cartridge penetrated the same steel completely 
out to 500 yards, and partially at 600 yards111. Hall then theorized that if the .220 bullets had 
a 7.0 caliber ogive112 to allow the bullet an identical profile to .30M2 bullets, that penetration 
performance between the two cartridges would be nearly equal due to the equal ballistic 
coefficient113. Hall also stumbled upon a unique characteristic of the .220 cartridge. He 
concluded that the .220 is nearly as effective as the .30M2 cartridge when the bullets are 
traveling at comparable velocities114, based on the terminal ballistics test of shooting into 
large blocks of clay in order to ascertain the wounding capabilities of the bullets. It appeared 
that the smaller caliber rounds would tumble inside the blocks of clay, causing large wound 
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channels. Because of this Hall theorized that at short to medium distances, the .220 cartridge, 
with a faster striking velocity, would actually be superior in its wounding capabilities to the 
.30M2 service cartridge115.  
  Although the Hall report determined that the experimental .220 cartridges had 
promise, the heads of United States Army Ordnance seemed uninterested and somewhat 
hostile to any sort of short-term applications for the small caliber high velocity concept. 
Chief of Army Ordnance Rifle Development Studler banned any further small caliber high 
velocity studies that challenged the current service rifle package or its successors116. Studler 
and his deputies continued to push for the T65 full power cartridge, and their interest in 
acquiring a rifle that was light in name only continued full steam ahead, despite the Hall 
Study. However, it seems that there were more people in lower echelons taking notice of the 
Marshall study. In June of 1952, Norman A. Hitchman, a member of the Operation Research 
Office of Johns Hopkins University, released another report also based on S.L.A. Marshall’s 
research in Korea. Hitchman concluded that as it stood in Korea, the best and worst 
marksmen were about equal in ability to hit enemy targets in that war117. This conclusion 
challenged traditional military training, but also of the traditional view of warfare that 
underlay both prior and current rifle development. 
 Hitchman’s report seemed to echo the Marshall study with the following conclusions. 
First, “The range at which the rifle is used most frequently in the battle and the ranges within 
which the greater fractions of man targets can be seen on the battlefield do not exceed 300 
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yards118”.  Both United States Marine and United States Army training of the period focused 
on precision marksmanship training out to 500 yards. Secondly, “Within these important 
battle ranges, the marksmanship of even expert riflemen is satisfactory only up to 100 yards; 
beyond 100 yards marksmanship declines sharply, reaching a low order at 300 yards.119” 
This conclusion was even more damning than Marshall, who had placed ideal effectiveness 
in Korea out to 150 yards. While these statements criticized the training of recruits, the 
Hitchman report also directly attacked current rifle development and ideology.  
 Hitchman stated, “Current models of fully automatic hand weapons are valueless 
from the standpoint of increasing the number of targets hit” and that “Certain of the costly 
high standards of accuracy observed in the manufacture of current rifles and ammunition 
can be relaxed without significant losses in overall hit performance. 120“ The lack of 
sophisticated construction had been one of the reasons that Col. Studler and many other high-
ranking officials in Army Ordnance had refused to consider many of the recent European 
developments. The Europeans’ extensive use of stamped steel, spot welded or riveted 
together with loose tolerances and stocked with plywood or Bakelite, appeared cheap and 
desperate compared to the forged milled steel and walnut of American arms. Adding to the 
criticism, and lending credence to the nearly simultaneous Hall study, the Hitchman report 
had one final recommendation to add. It stated clearly that “To create militarily acceptable 
damage at common battle ranges, missiles of smaller caliber than the present standard .30 
caliber can be used without loss in wounding effects and with substantial logistical and 
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overall military gains.121” The report contained multiple charts quantifying the effectiveness 
of the current M1 Garand rifle in relation to a small caliber high velocity weapon. The results 
showed that in all types of environments and terrain, the small caliber high velocity weapon 
was superior to the Garand and its .30M2 ammunition. With varying types of terrain, the 
small caliber weapon varied in superiority; in Class A terrain, such as that found in Korea, 
the improvement was marginal. However, a Class C terrain like that encountered in 
Normandy during the Second World War, showed the small caliber principle to be clearly 
superior to the M1 Garand rifle package, the package that had equipped soldiers in America’s 
last war122.  
 It seems the trilogy of reports from Marshall, Hall, and Hitchman began to convince 
more and more people, particularly civilians in research and development, of the limitations 
of current U.S. military tactics and rifle development and of the feasibility and superiority of 
the small caliber high velocity concept. However, even the Hall .220 caliber firing 
experiments only analyzed the feasibility of the cartridges, which was only half the package 
in small arms development. By 1952, the U.S. military had made absolutely no attempts to 
put a design platform with the cartridge that would test the real world applications of the 
concept. There were two reasons for this. First, the top Army officials, including the Chief of 
Army Ordnance Rifle Development, stood firmly behind the Earle Harvey and Garand based 
designs for the T65 Cartridge, giving these projects the most attention, resources, and 
funding. In the new atomic age, Army Ordnance’s significantly smaller budget for small 
arms research and development left little remaining funds for other projects. This was why 
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the Hall firing experiments received only a small amount of material support, in the form of 
200 bullets. These secondary projects could only compete for funding as long-term 
developments, unable to challenge the Light Rifle Project’s more traditional rifle and 
cartridge that offered more immediate value. 
 Fighting against funding issues and the current tide of popularity favoring the Light 
Rifle Project and the full power .30 caliber T65 Cartridge, some officials in research and 
development sought a way to gain approval  and hence funding to create a platform for the 
small caliber high velocity concept. Once again, they found their answer in Marshall and the 
Korean War. The Marshall study criticized the M1 and M2 carbines for being completely 
unreliable in combat and severely lacking in terminal wounding ballistics except at very 
close ranges. By 1952, the carbine had few fans on the battlefield or in Army Ordnance. 
Since Col. Studler had banned any further comparisons of the small caliber high velocity 
theory and .30 caliber rifles, the answer was the M1 and M2 carbine. When Donald Hall fired 
his 200 test rounds, it was under the supervision of the head of Aberdeen Ballistic Lab’s 
Small Arms and Aircraft Weapons Section, G. A. Gustafson123. Gustafson pitched his 
proposal as a product improvement project for the M1 and M2 carbines. The proposal 
convinced Gustafson’s superiors and his team received approval for carbine experimentation.   
 From November 13, 1952 until August 21, 1953, the project limped along.  Gustafson 
designed and fabricated his own .22 caliber cartridge and worked almost entirely alone to 
convert a standard M2 carbine to fire the new cartridge124. Throughout his final report, 
Gustafson made sure to avoid the notion that this would serve as a mainline battle rifle like 
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the M1 Garand. Setting out his motivation for the project, Gustafson argued that the M1 and 
M2 carbine problems appeared partially because of misapplication of the design in the field. 
The M1 carbine and the later M2 variation had originated as a supplement for the 1911 A1 
.45 caliber Colt pistol, supplies of which were critically short at the outbreak of hostilities in 
the Second World War. However, the carbines evolved more into a general issue weapon 
meant to fill in the production gaps of the M1 Garand and Thompson sub-machine guns.  
This misapplication of the M1 and M2 carbine carried on into the Korean War as well. 
Designed originally to replace a pistol, the ammunition it fired was designed for extreme 
close range effectiveness. Gustafson noted that battlefield needs could create a special role 
for a carbine type weapon and argued that with the small caliber high velocity cartridge, the 
M1 and M2 carbines could become effective out to medium ranges of 300 yards125.  
 After explaining why the M2 carbine had received such a poor reputation on the 
battlefield, Gustafson asserted that the solution was the small caliber high velocity concept. 
Addressing the inability for accurate fully automatic fire, Gustafson explained that the 
combination of a lightweight carbine and a large caliber heavy bullet created a large and 
significant recoil impulse that gave poor accuracy when done repeatedly in a short time, as in 
fully automatic fire126. The argument, simple Newtonian physics at work, was a subtle and 
indirect argument against the then-current Light Rifle Project. The .30 carbine cartridge was 
similar to an intermediate cartridge, and if an intermediate cartridge is difficult to control 
during fully automatic fire, then it is logical to assume that the average soldier would find a 
full power cartridge like the .30 caliber T65 in a light rifle significantly harder to control.  
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 Gustafson continued to argue against large caliber weapons by suggesting that in a 
small caliber high velocity firearm, compensators127 would work much better, given they 
have a much better powder charge to bullet weight ratio than large caliber cartridges128. 
Hence, the addition of a compensator to the already low recoil inherent in small caliber 
weapons creates a weapon with negligible recoil and reduced muzzle rise through the 
redirection of propellant gasses129. Gustafson’s report then detailed the ease of converting a 
standard carbine to fire the new cartridge, saying that modifications were relatively simple. 
The largest and most important part of the conversion process was replacing the .30 caliber 
barrel with one of .22 caliber130. Gustafson modified the bolt and cartridge extractor to use a 
cartridge with a slightly larger base in diameter. His team installed springs that were more 
powerful, a bipod from a Browning automatic rifle, and a simple compensator131. Although 
not necessary, Gustafson machined some parts to remove material and further bring down the 
weight of the firearm.  
 The ammunition modification was also a relatively simple affair. Just as the Hall 
study had used the .220 Swift commercial cartridge as a basis for experiments, Gustafson 
selected a commercial cartridge, the relatively new 222 Remington cartridge as the basis for 
his carbine132. However, since the receiver and ammunition magazine were designed for a 33 
millimeter long cartridge, the 222 Remington was simply too long to work. Gustafson 
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trimmed the cartridge cases to a length that would properly fit the receiver and magazine and 
then simply reloaded the components to create the ammunition required133.  
 This essentially created the new weapon. Test firing of the weapon commenced in 
spring, 1953 at the Small Arms and Aircraft Weapons Section of the Ballistics Research 
Laboratory at Aberdeen. The results of the test showed remarkable improvement over the 
standard carbine and ammunition. Using the new ammunition and compensator, the .22 
caliber Gustafson carbine had 28% of the radial dispersion of shots of the M2 carbine and 
ammunition at 100 yards134. At 300 yards, it had 52% of the radial dispersion of the standard 
carbine and ammunition135. In semi-automatic fire at 300 yards, Gustafson’s carbine was 
52% more accurate than the standard carbine, and 84% more accurate than the .45 caliber 
sub-machine guns in use at the time136. The Gustafson carbine was also easier to shoot, as the 
.22 caliber ammunition has a much flatter trajectory at 300 yards, making sight adjustments 
almost unnecessary, unlike in the standard .30 caliber carbine137. The .22 caliber ammunition 
outperformed the .30 carbine cartridge in penetration of hardened and soft metal plating, and 
against body armor the .22 Gustafson ammunition was equal to a standard carbine138. The 
only test where the .30 carbine cartridge outperformed the .22 Gustafson cartridges was in 
kinetic energy at long-range. However, Gustafson, like Hall, noticed that the bullet seemed to 
wound equally at similar ranges, despite the reduced kinetic energy. He theorized this pattern 
was due to higher velocities inherent in the .22 caliber ammunition139. Gustafson 
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recommended that the Biophysics Laboratory at the Army Chemical Center test the 
ammunition140.  
 Gustafson concluded that the modified carbine and ammunition were capable of 
delivering accurate and effective fire at ranges up to 300 yards. The fact that the modified 
carbine weighed 40% less than the M1 Garand rifle, combined with the fact that the 
ammunition weighed 65% less than the .30M2 cartridge, would allow the average soldier to 
carry a considerable amount of ammunition. This would allow soldiers carrying the carbine 
to supplement the M1 Garand’s longer range power out to 300 yards. Of the total 1,900 
rounds of ammunition fired during the tests, only three stoppages occurred, and all were 
ammunition related. Gustafson recommended that Army Ordnance acquire and test 20,000 
rounds of his ammunition and five modified carbines at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in 
order to see if ammunition of this type offered any advantages over current military 
cartridges141.  
 By the time the report was finished and issued in 1953, Col. Rene Studler had retired 
from Army Ordnance, leaving this and other programs, including the Light Rifle Project, in 
total disarray142. However, the work of Gustafson, Hall, Hitchman, and Marshall did get a 
new line of research and development initiated. Project SALVO, the new program aimed to 
investigate the potential of small caliber high velocity rounds, as well as multiple projectile 
dispersion ammunition, as possible longer-term developments. Although Col. Studler was 
gone, the set of high-ranking officers remaining in Army Ordnance still included many 
traditionalist disciples. Before retirement, Studler did have one final victory. NATO, thanks 
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to his efforts, adopted the T65 cartridge as the 7.62 NATO shortly after he retired, leaving 
any prospect for the small caliber high velocity concept a long-term one.  
 The early 1950’s found the traditional minded high ranking officers in Army 
Ordnance in control, but with challenges coming from all sides. As mentioned before, with 
small arms there are always two parts, platform and cartridge. While criticizing the foreign 
platforms, the heads of Army Ordnance also fought against pressure to adopt foreign 
cartridges. The European delegations from Great Britain and Belgium challenged the old 
standard of a large caliber, full power cartridge by supporting a large caliber intermediate 
cartridge. While resisting foreign intermediate cartridges, the traditional officials in Army 
Ordnance also fought new ideas from within their own ranks. Young ordnance officers and 
civilian analysts at the Ballistics Research Laboratory and the Operations Research Office at 
Johns Hopkins University challenged the Army’s standard vision of modern combat, and 
developed new cartridges to fit their alternative view of modern infantry warfare.  
 Beginning with Donald Hall and S.L.A. Marshall in 1950, the civilian and military 
divide within the various departments of Army Ordnance began to appear even stronger. The 
military officers in Army Ordnance tended to believe that the full power .30 caliber cartridge 
had worked in the past and would continue to work. They firmly believed that combat in the 
Second World War had shown the superiority of American long-range marksmanship and 
precision long-range firepower produced by the .30M2 cartridge and M1 Garand rifle. As 
discussed earlier, this view was in truth accurate only in the Northern European Plain. 
Norman Hitchman did much to undermine that view by showing that reduced caliber high 
velocity cartridges could actually be superior in a wide variety of terrain.  
 51
 The experimental cartridges and later test firings of Donald Hall’s and his .220 Swift 
based ammunition showed that there was a viable third option in the cartridge debate. The 
small caliber high velocity cartridge allowed more reduction in weight and recoil than the 
European design of the intermediate cartridge and the officially adopted American design of 
the full power T65 cartridge. The small caliber high velocity cartridges were more accurate 
than the intermediate European cartridges due to a flatter trajectory, and could out-penetrate 
them, nearly matching the performance of the old .30M2 cartridge out to medium ranges. 
However, while useful at medium ranges, the small caliber high velocity cartridge was still 
not able to match older traditional type cartridges at long distance. Army rifle training for 
infantry soldiers still focused on firing out to 500 yards. Moreover, while the reduced .22 
caliber rounds produced by Hall performed accurately at that range, they could no longer 
match penetration or energy of the heavier bullets at that range. They simply lost energy too 
fast because of their light weight.  
 However, the departure of Col. Studler as Chief of Army Ordnance Rifle 
Development in 1953 created opportunities for alternative theories. The disarray caused by 
sudden lack of the leadership that had run Army Ordnance Rifle Development for so long 
allowed the dedicated civilians and junior officers to throw their projects a lifeline by 
convincing higher Army Ordnance authorities to start Project SALVO. It kept the option of 
the small caliber high velocity concept on life support, while America and NATO carried 
forth with the T65 Cartridge as the 7.62 NATO. The small caliber high velocity cartridge 
possessed merit; however, it would take longer for certain men to seek and design a new and 
suitable platform.  
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Small Caliber High Velocity Rifles   
 In 1953, the United States Army Ordnance Department gave approval for a long-term 
project aimed at producing new types of ammunition for both current and future weapons 
platforms. Designated Project SALVO, it covered multiple new ideas for ammunition and 
rifle platforms. SALVO promoted a wide range of ideas from using shotgun shells filled with 
hardened steel flechette darts, to so-called duplex and triplex rounds containing multiple 
bullets per cartridge, to the small caliber high velocity concept. All of these ideas were 
different means to one end, the ability for the average soldier to increase hit probability on 
enemy targets. The flechette, duplex, and triplex cartridges sought to do this by using several 
projectiles per round of ammunition. The small caliber high velocity concept instead sought 
to do this by reducing recoil and weight, creating a package that would be easier for the 
average soldier to fire successfully while carrying more ammunition.  Two types of small 
caliber high velocity rounds underwent testing. Trials continued on the Gustafson’s carbine 
already tested at the Ballistics Research Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Other 
trials applied the concept of the T65 cartridge case, altering it to accept a .22 caliber bullet 
and modifying the Belgian FAL, then the most advanced design to fire it143. Tests showed 
that neither cartridge nor the bullet was optimal, and further funding would be necessary for 
continued development.  
 While Col. Rene Studler retired from his post as Chief of Army Ordnance Rifle 
Development in 1953, causing several programs to go into temporary disarray, the power 
vacuum did not last long. Dr. Frederick H. Carten soon became the new head of Army 
Ordnance. Dr. Carten was Col. Studler’s civilian executive for several years and although a 
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civilian, he shared the same views on weapons development and combat theory as the former 
Chief of Ordnance Rifle Development. Army Ordnance would change little under the new 
chief, with old policies and practices revealed in the continuity in programs and pursuits. The 
first such evidence lay in the fate of Project SALVO. When Project SALVO ran out of funds, 
William C. Davis, a staff member working on the Gustafson carbine, requested additional 
funding. When the engineers at the Ballistics Research Laboratory submitted a formal 
application for more funding, Dr. Carten simply gave them a verbal “No”, as Davis later 
recalled144. While Carten possessed the same ideas as Col. Studler, Carten had more 
enthusiasm for the Garand based T44 platform, and overcame opposition regarding the T65 
cartridge or the T44 rifle platform. His actions and tactics over the next few years showed 
that Carten was willing to bend rules and play politics in order to keep the T44 program 
ahead of its competitors such as the Belgian FAL or the small caliber ballistics studies.  
 While the attempt by the Ballistic Research Laboratory to gain more funding for their 
Project SALVO failed to sway Carten from his traditionalist doubts on new cartridges, it did 
get the attention of others in the Army through a circuitous route. In February 1957, after the 
poor showing of the underdeveloped Armalite AR-10 rifles, General Devers of Fairchild 
Aircraft (the parent company of Armalite) visited Dr. Carten. Previously, Armalite had been 
overly confident about its AR-10 design and refused government funding for the 
development of a rifle platform specifically made for the small caliber high velocity 
concept145. On this visit, General Devers accepted and received a briefing on the SALVO 
research, although the Army was not then offering any government funding or sponsorship to 
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the firm. At the same time, General Willard G. Wyman, the Commanding General of 
Continental Army Command, had been impressed with the Armalite rifles demonstrated for 
him at Fort Monroe in 1956. General Wyman notified Eugene Stoner, the weapon’s designer, 
that the Infantry User Board, his user end-testing group, liked the idea of a small caliber high 
velocity concept based weapon146. General Wyman made the recommendation, according to 
William C. Davis, after reading a copy of the SALVO request, which outlined the ballistic 
specifications. Wyman gave the SALVO ballistic specifications to Armalite’s Eugene Stoner 
as a guide for possible future cartridges147.  
 Hence, Armalite executives and designers became aware that although the top 
officials in Army Ordnance strongly supported the T44 and 7.62NATO/T65 cartridge, other 
departments did not.  High officials in Continental Army Command, as well as others under 
Dr. Carten in the Ballistics Research Laboratory and the Infantry User Board, did not feel 
committed to the T44 or the 7.62 NATO cartridge. Historians have tended to ignore this 
small series of events or underplay its importance. However, the details show that, as some 
observers of the time noticed, the ideology of the Chief of Army Ordnance Rifle 
Development did not command agreement throughout the ordnance corps, with particular 
dissention by the Infantry User Board, and other high-ranking officials within the Army 
itself.  A once cohesive organization, United States Army Ordnance Rifle Development, 
forged together by Col. Studler in the 1930’s and 1940’s,  began to show cracks, as various 
factions within the wide array of departments became more vocal in their opposition.  
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 At the forefront of the newer path was General Wyman. In 1957, with the blessing of 
the head of Continental Army Command, the Infantry User Board issued formal requests for 
new small caliber high velocity rifle designs to Armalite and Winchester Arms. The requests, 
very vague in language, asked for rifles in .22 caliber, six pounds in weight, with a 
conventional stock, and a 20 round ammunition magazine. The request did not specify a 
cartridge, only a caliber. However, expectation were that the cartridge needed to  penetrate an 
army steel helmet or 10 gauge cold rolled steel at 300 yards, have equal trajectory and 
accuracy to the current M1 Garand rifle and ammunition, and also offer equal or better 
wounding ability to the .30 M1 carbine148.  
 However, showing the growing splits in the Army with regard to rifle development, 
testing, and acquisition, the desired specification range changed as the request moved up the 
ladder to the Pentagon. The Infantry User Board, believing that modern warfare involved 
short to medium range fire, set the performance range to a maximum of 300 yards. As the 
request advanced to General Wyman, Continental Army Command deemed the range 
recommended by the Infantry User Board to be too limited, and increased the performance 
range to 400 yards. When Continental Army Command passed the request up to the 
Pentagon, the range increased again, now set at 500 yards149. Army recruits received rifle 
instruction during their basic training at this range.  While most traditional cartridges like the 
7.62 NATO and .30M2 could easily perform well past 500 yards, for small caliber weapons, 
this represented a major hurdle. Since the weight of the bullets was limited along with the 
powder charge, the bullet lost kinetic energy very quickly, so a cartridge of this type that 
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performed well at 300 yards might perform poorly at 500. This caused problems later for the 
participating firms and arsenals, since the design process was far ahead of the slowly 
evolving longer range requirements. 
 Throughout 1957, Armalite designed and tested two prototypes to submit for trials by 
the Infantry User Board at Fort Benning.  The first, which Armalite designers called the 
Stopette, had a traditional rifle appearance. It featured a traditional type of drop heel stock150, 
but used the same lightweight alloys and plastics as the AR-10151. The Stopette used the 
Stoner type method of direct gas impingement operation, also borrowed from the AR-10. 
However, the Stopette suffered from poor performance in fully automatic mode, since the 
high cyclic rate of fire, combined with a drop heel stock, caused excessive muzzle climb and 
poor controllability. The second was an AR-10 scaled down to chamber the commercial 222 
Remington cartridge. This layout proved much more stable and possessed a lower cyclic rate 
of fire. Eugene Stoner demonstrated this model to General Wyman and high-end Continental 
Army Command officers on May 6, 1957, six days after the official adoption of the T44 
Light Rifle as the M-14152. General Wyman became so impressed with the new Armalite rifle 
that he requested funds for several test guns. The request received approval and the Army 
ordered ten more rifles. Armalite officially threw its attention and resources behind the new 
rifle, designated AR-15.  
 Armalite was not the only commercial entity to submit a design for consideration by 
the Infantry User Board at this time. General Wyman and Continental Army Command also 
issued a request for a small caliber light rifle to the Winchester Western Division of the Olin 
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Mathieson Chemical Corporation. Winchester Arms had a long history of cooperation with 
the Army as a contractor for rifle production since the First World War. Winchester had also 
designed America’s first light weight rifle, the M1 carbine, in 1941153. The Gustafson 
modifications to the standard M2 carbine, the fully automatic capable version of the earlier 
M1 carbine, redeemed its reputation (to a minor degree) among some ordnance officials. 
Indeed, Winchester’s Ralph Clarkson based the .224 Winchester automatic rifle on the earlier 
design, sometimes marketing it to some as an improvement on the M2 carbine154. However, 
when Winchester submitted the rifle, they avoided comparing the new WAR rifle to the 
earlier carbines in their official reports, fearing the existing prejudice towards the M2 carbine 
in many circles.  
 Winchester was eager to get its prototype submitted before their Armalite competitor. 
Winchester was in relatively poor business shape at the time. The commercial gun market of 
the late 1950’s was awash in military surplus, as governments around the world dumped their 
surplus arms on the American market. American Rifleman, little more than a informative 
firearms enthusiast magazine of the National Rifle Association at the time, contained several 
full page ads per issue from importers offering military surplus rifles, pistols, and shotguns at 
bargain prices. This put severe pressure on commercial arms makers who tried to market new 
commercial guns for two to three times the price of unissued military surplus arms. 
Winchester had not received a military contract for arms production since 1945, missing the 
Korean War era contracts for M1 Garand rifles. After Winchester submitted its design 
months ahead of the deadline in 1957, the Army changed the range specifications. 
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Winchester’s rifle and cartridge, designed for 300 yards were suddenly expected to perform 
at the new 500-yard requirements155. As Winchester could not produce a new rifle and 
cartridge in time, company engineers tried to increase range by adding more propellant. That 
strategy worked but created pressures that made the rifle unsafe, forcing the company to 
withdraw from the competition after the first series of tests156.  Armalite, on the other hand, 
had time to modify its rifle and cartridge to meet the longer range requirements.  
 The testing commenced on March 1958, and the Armalite AR-15 Rifle performed 
very well. The Infantry User Board recommended only a few minor changes to the gun. 
While the AR-15 did not outperform the M1 Garand or M-14 in penetration, it did meet the 
requirements for penetration given to Eugene Stoner by the Infantry User Board. The 
Infantry User Board also found it to be equal or superior to the M-14 and M1 Garand in all 
the other categories. A mere sixteen months after the official adoption of the M-14 as the 
new U.S. Service Rifle, the Infantry User Board recommended the AR-15 as its preferred 
replacement for the M1 Garand, thus coming into direct conflict with the Chief of Army 
Ordnance Rifle Development157.  
 Dr. Carten, the Chief of Army Ordnance Rifle Development, and other traditionalists 
worried about the amount of praise that the small caliber high velocity projects received from 
Continental Army Command and the Infantry User Board at Fort Benning. In addition, 
General Wyman’s use of the Ballistic Research Laboratory and the Infantry User Board as 
testing agencies skirted around the traditional testing authorities of the Chief of Army 
Ordnance Rifle Development and Springfield Armory. During these tests, Dr. Carten found 
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his authority and influence greatly limited. In defense of the T44 program, Dr. Carten found 
an opening by making an issue of capillary action.  
 The AR-15 not only challenged the T44 rifle platform, it also made an issue the .30 
caliber T65 cartridge it fired. Dr. Carten felt that the .30 caliber T65 offered superiority in a 
number of ways and sought to discredit the .22 caliber of the AR-15. Carten found his answer 
in the rain tests. While the primary purpose of the rain tests were to gauge reliability of rifles 
in a wet environment, Carten knew that capillary action would make water stick in the 
reduced bore size of the small .22 caliber barrels. While tipping down the barrel worked to 
clear the traditional .30 caliber rifles, this was impossible on .22 caliber rifles. So after the 
initial shinning tests conducted by the Infantry User Board, Dr. Carten used his authority to 
order a supplemental rain test on the rifles. He also made it clear that the test that applied to 
.30 caliber rifles must be identical to the supplemental tests on the .22 caliber rifles158. 
Although the tester could tip the small caliber rifles downward and retract the bolt to allow 
air to enter the chamber and hence allow the bore to drain, Carten forbade this since it 
deviated from the standard test. With the testers adhering strictly to the standard test 
procedure, the water in the bore .22 caliber bore did not drain, and the rifle barrel actually 
split, due to the excess pressure caused by the water. The test therefore raised two issues with 
the AR-15. First, the barrel on the AR-10 had burst during tests, and now so had the AR-15, 
calling into question the ability of Armalite to make good barrel designs. Secondly, the 
caliber, while technically promising, had water retention deficiencies. Critics of the .22 
caliber rifles did not point out that .30 caliber rifles had also burst barrels from water in the 
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past, and that the smaller the bore, the harder it was for water to get inside in the first place. 
The final report also ignored the easy fix of slightly retracting the bolt to allow air in the 
chamber to drain the bore.  
 While Dr. Carten had success in raising questions about Armalite’s AR-15 in the 
supplemental rain tests, he also suppressed any further favorable reviews of the small caliber 
weapons originating from ordnance officials. As it turned out, there was a report (that has 
since come to light) from Lawrence Moore, the main civilian test engineer at the Infantry and 
Aircraft Weapons Division of Developments and Proof Services at Aberdeen’s Ballistic 
Research Laboratory. His report, A Test of Rifle, Caliber .22, AR-15: Rifle, Lightweight 
Military, Caliber .224 and Pertinent Ammunition did not condemn the rifle. While Larry 
Moore had often been critical of other rifle designs, this February 1959 report extolled the 
AR-15’s design for its reliability, handiness, and hit probability. Moore turned over the report 
directly to Carten’s office, but Carten did not pass it on or include any of Moore’s 
information or opinions in his reports, thus silencing Moore. This refusal to release the report 
kept valid information on the AR-15 from others and effectively ostracized Moore and any 
influence his opinions might carry with the Powell Board. 159   
 However, other testing of the AR-15 around the same time showed a growing 
division of opinions amongst the various ordnance and testing entities. Although the Infantry 
User Board Headquarters at Fort Benning showed enthusiasm for the AR-15 and the 
concepts it embodied, the Infantry User Board division at Fort Greely supported the 
traditionalist view and the M-14 program. While the Fort Greely group released no official 
documents praising one weapon over the other, a series of events suggests they possibly 
                                                 
159
 Ezell, Edward and R. Blake Stevens. The Black Rifle: M16 Retrospective. 71 
 61
adopted unfair testing practices when the AR-15 underwent arctic trials. In December 1958, 
the test board at Fort Greely contacted Eugene Stoner, requesting his presence in Alaska. 
When Eugene Stoner arrived, he assumed the tests were about to take place, and he would 
supervise as an engineer and repair any rifles should they break or need special care. This 
followed the basic agreement between the government and Armalite, dating back to the 
initial AR-10 tests of 1956. When Stoner arrived, the testing board informed him that the 
tests were already over and that several of the rifles needed repair. Stoner, shocked at this, 
proceeded to examine the test rifles and found several modifications had been made to the 
rifles, modifications that were not necessary for general maintenance. The testers told Stoner 
the rifles had performed poorly, yet these late modifications had most likely caused a series 
of malfunctions and poor performance. The rifles had apparently been in perfect working 
order when they left Fort Benning, so logically, the Fort Greely personnel performed all the 
modifications. In later comments, Stoner considered these modifications nothing less than 
sabotage by the ordnance officials to make the AR-15 perform poorly160.  
 Accuracy was the first complaint levied by officials at Fort Greely against the AR-15 
rifles. However, on inspection of the rifles, Stoner noted that someone had removed the front 
sights at some point and then incorrectly reinstalled them. Armalite installed the front sights 
on AR-15 rifles by notching the barrel and then securing the front sights to it by tightly 
driving in two tapered pins to create a very solid mount. According to Stoner, on one rifle, 
someone drove the pins in backwards, creating a loose sight that moved around easily161. On 
other test rifles, the taper pins were missing, replaced by loose fitting homemade pins 
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produced from ground down welding rods162. This not only would cause poor accuracy, but 
also other problems. Since the AR-15 rifle’s front sight also doubles as the gas block163, a 
loose front sight would cause possible gas leakage or a partially blocked gas vent164. Hence, a 
weak pneumatic impulse on the action might likely cause malfunctions in the feeding and 
extraction operations.  
 Another suspicious modification to the AR-15s at Fort Greely appeared on the butt 
plate fasteners on the rear stock. Photos taken of the test rifle and provided by Stoner show 
that the upper fastener, which should have a vent hole in it, does not. While a simple fastener 
on most other rifles, the butt plate fastener on the AR-15 does serve a purpose by eliminating 
possible pneumatic and hydraulic resistance in the movement of the recoil buffer and spring 
assembly. The hole allowed any accumulated liquid lubricant or trapped air to escape on the 
extraction cycle, while preventing a reduction in forward velocity on the return feeding 
stroke. This lack of a drainage/vent hole might account for complaints of malfunctions 
recorded by the Fort Greely personnel against the AR-15 during testing. 
 According to Stoner, while he was repairing the rifles in Alaska, the Fort Greely test 
board delivered the arctic test reports to Continental Army Commands Deputy General 
Herbert Powell, the official in charge of evaluating the Armalite entry. No one notified 
Armalite or Stoner of this until many months later when the Armalite representatives read the 
official recommendation of the Powell Board165. 
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 Dr. Carten appears to have played politics well. The last report issued on the new 
rifles by the Infantry User Board in September 1958 showed reduced faith in the small 
caliber concept. This new apprehension about the AR-15 spread once the Powell Board 
received the Infantry User Board’s evaluation and recommendations. The report stated 
clearly that the AR-15 exhibited significantly more controllability than the M-14 rifles166 and 
the design received praise for its ease of disassembly for cleaning and general 
maintenance167. However, the praise stopped there. The Infantry User Board noted that the 
M-14 rifle and ammunition exhibited greater penetration and that the sights on the M-14 
were clearly superior to the AR-15. In all other respects of reliability and performance, the 
Infantry User Board found the M-14 and AR-15 platforms were relatively equal. However, 
the supplemental rain test results made it into the report, and thus the Infantry User Board 
recommended that the rifle be sent back to Armalite to address the issues and then have the 
company submit 16 more test rifles when modifications were completed168.  
 Dr. Carten’s office attached a recommendation to the report, saying that in order to 
alleviate the capillary action of the Armalite AR-15, Armalite should modify the rifle to use a 
.258 caliber cartridge169. The problem here, probably known to Carten, was the fact that no 
.258 caliber cartridge existed commercially at that time. Stoner and others later commented 
that, even given the Infantry User Board’s unenthusiastic report on the AR-15, the Powell 
Board in January, 1959 was about to recommend purchasing a further 750 AR-15 rifles for 
further testing and development. That is, until the results of the Fort Greely tests came in, 
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which led to a stalling of the decision. Eventually the Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell 
Taylor, asked for the Powell Board’s recommendation on the replacement of the M-14. He 
received their report that suggested replacing the M-14 with a .258 caliber AR-15170.  
Maxwell Taylor, influenced by the arctic and rain tests, countermanded this and announced 
in February 1959 that “Only the M-14 was suitable for Army use171”. 
 Dr. Carten had succeeded in upholding the arguments favoring the M-14 against the 
AR-15. However, while Carten and the arms traditionalists resisted Armalite’s competition, 
in early 1958 some engineers at Springfield Armory produced a small caliber high velocity 
weapon of their own. Earle Harvey, the father of the T25 and T47 Light Rifle Projects of the 
late 1940’s and early 1950’s, kept a close eye on the small caliber rifles, and under his own 
authority started a new small caliber project at Springfield Armory. Having read about the 
project SALVO trials of the Gustafson carbine and .22 caliber FAL, Harvey decided to work 
with the commercial 222 Remington round172. Since this rifle used the T25 method of 
operation, Harvey saw it as a way to legitimate the design as being viable with the small 
caliber ammunition. Springfield Armory ordered 10,000 rounds of Harvey ammunition from 
Remington’s cartridge manufacturing division173. However, once the two prototype weapons 
and ammunition arrived, Carten became aware of the experimental program at Springfield 
Arsenal. Already upset about General Wyman and Armalite going around the traditional 
testing and procurement channels, Carten became angry that his own research and design 
armory had built a prototype for submission, and he ordered the Springfield project 
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terminated. Carten also decreed that he would tolerate no further work on the small caliber 
high velocity concept174.  
 While Carten’s methods for choosing to undermine the small caliber high velocity 
projects were questionable, there was a certain logic to his position. The fact is, the M-14 
rifle was the result of over a decade of research and development in the form of the Light 
Rifle Project. The ultimate goal of the project, especially under Col. Studler, was 
standardization. Unwilling to bend in its approach to modern warfare, Army Ordnance 
engaged in a battle against the .280 British intermediate cartridge, and its top leaders pushed 
for adoption of the full power T65 cartridge as the NATO standard cartridge. Add to this the 
fact that many European NATO countries were far into updating to new rifles chambering 
the new .30 caliber NATO cartridge (T65). Moreover, should the AR-15 be adopted, there 
would again be logistical issues with NATO allies regarding ammunition175.   While the AR-
15 certainly showed promise, any  adoption of it in 1959 meant that procuring it and 
replacing the M1 Garand would theoretically take several more additional years before the 
rifles started rolling off the assembly lines and into the hands of soldiers. Moreover, Armalite 
was not set up to be a large-scale arms producer. The company’s main mission since its 
founding had been to sell production licenses for its designs. Because of this, there was no 
large-scale manufacturing capability for the AR-15 rifle. If production contracts were issued, 
the AR-15 would require unique tooling and equipment for mass production of the aluminum 
and plastic parts used in the Armalite design.   
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 While the M-14 was not perfect, to the logical military mind, its continued use must 
have seemed necessary. Production of the M-14 could use much of the M1 Garand tooling 
and manufacturing equipment. It still represented a technical improvement over the older 
Garand, although a marginal one. It would allow the fastest rearming of American troops to 
the NATO standard round, would require little retraining on the new weapon (due to its 
Garand heritage), and it would finally put a universal arm in the hands of the American 
soldier. This meant the military could finally phase out the M1 and M2 carbines, the 
Browning automatic rifle, and the Thompson and M3 sub-machine guns. This changeover 
would streamline and ease the supply of ammunition, repair parts, and ammunition 
magazines. However, Carten, most likely afraid of cuts to funding and loss of prestige for the 
government arsenals and all of Army Ordnance, did not use this logic to push for M-14 
procurement and defend its superiority. Instead, he used the tactics outlined earlier, denying 
that the AR-15 possessed any sort of technical merit in its current form. The fight to preserve 
the status of the M-14 rifle as the standard issue rifle of the U.S. Army was indeed 
successful. However, in the struggle, Dr. Carten’s position lost some of its power and 
prestige. General Wyman undermined the traditional channels of testing and evaluation 
through the creation of the Powell Board and use of the Ballistics Research Laboratory and 
Infantry User Board as the primary authorities.  This had been the domain of the Chief of 
Army Ordnance Rifle Development and Springfield Armory in the past. It set a precedent for 
going around the traditional channels. In the meanwhile, the M-14 Rifle Program fell into 
general disarray, calling into question the abilities of Army Ordnance to develop and procure 
rifles. 
 67
Mismanagement of M-14 Rifle Procurement 
 Although the United States Army officially adopted the T44 (now designated M-14) 
as the new standard rifle in May of 1957176, for the next year, no attempts were made to 
ready the design for any sort of large-scale production. The main issue standing in the way 
was funding. From 1955 until 1958, Springfield Armory had received no new funding for 
product improvement on the T44/M-14 rifle. By 1957, the lack of money meant that 
Springfield Armory could not prepare its technical date package on the rifle, the detailed 
blueprint drawings and specifications of the M-14. While over 500 produced rifles existed at 
this point, there existed no standard specifications for the M-14 rifle. The blueprinted 
technical data package was necessary for mass production at commercial contractors177. No 
large-scale procurement was possible until the date package was ready. Springfield Armory 
submitted requests for funding of the data package for the fiscal years 1957, 1958, and 1959, 
and every year Ordnance Weapons Command at Rock Island Arsenal, the ordnance office in 
charge of funding of all ordnance projects, denied the request178. At the same time, the 
Springfield Armory faced general funding cuts. As the production and repair of arms at 
Springfield Arsenal from the Korean War replenished arsenals, the funding for the armory 
decreased significantly. Springfield Armory lost roughly half of its staff from 1957-1959, 
which already was down 50% from its peak of the Korean War179.  
 The funding for the technical data package for the M-14 finally arrived from 
Ordnance Weapons Command in mid 1958. However, where the normal timetable for 
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preparing a package of this sort was a full year, Ordnance Weapon Command ordered it 
finished in six months. This, combined with the skeleton crew with which Springfield was 
operating, only compounded the difficulty when Ordnance Weapons Command ordered the 
project finished even faster than the allotted six months. That last order forbade any further 
research into improvements to the design adopted in 1957. Finally, in April 1958, a 
production order for 15,669 M-14 Rifles arrived at Springfield along with some desperately 
needed funds. Springfield re-hired personnel; however, most of the skilled tool and die 
makers laid off earlier refused their old positions, due to the poor job security the armory 
offered180.  
 However, with many commercial arms makers in financial difficulty, policy makers 
in Washington decided to place caps on rifle production at the government arsenals. The 
government capped Springfield Armory production at 2,000 M-14 Rifles per month, a 
fraction of its capacity with a full staff181. Commercial arms makers would end up producing 
the great majority of rifles in M-14 procurement. The Army began to solicit bids from the 
commercial arms makers for two initial contracts of 35,000 M-14 rifles in 1958. Ultimately, 
the Army aimed to have 2,000,000 rifles by 1964, with total procurement eventually aimed at 
5,000,000 rifles182. The government policy of the era called for one contract to go to a 
company with the lowest bid. From the list of bids received, Winchester Olin received an 
initial contract for 35,000 rifles in 1959 at $65.75 per rifle, with deliveries to begin in 
February 1960183. Policy required the other contract to go to a firm in an economically 
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depressed area with high unemployment. From this list of arms manufacturers, the 
government selected the firm of Harrington and Richardson of Worchester, Massachusetts184. 
  Harrington and Richardson had a history of military arms production, but possessed a 
very poor reputation for quality and consistency in its Korean War production of the M1 
Garand185. Many historians of small arms have focused on the poor wartime production, but 
have not explained why Harrington and Richardson produced troubled M1 Garand rifles. The 
catalog of the company shows that the primary type of arms offered by Harrington and 
Richardson were simple utility firearms. The company offered simple nineteenth century 
designed break-open single shot shotguns; single shot bolt action rifles, and old Smith and 
Wesson pattern revolvers chambered in weak cartridges186.  The company marketed these 
types of guns to low budget sportsmen and hunters. Hence, the company and its employees’ 
experience came from building plain and simple rifles, shotguns, and revolvers firing low-
pressure cartridges that allowed generous tolerances in manufacturing and material qualities. 
It is no surprise the company encountered such difficulty during the Korean War in 
manufacturing a complex semi-automatic rifle with a more narrow set of tolerances. In fact, 
the M1 Garand rifle was comparably loose in tolerances compared to the new M-14, meaning 
that just as with the Garand, Harrington and Richardson would again face incredible 
difficulties in ramping up for M-14 production.  
 In 1960, a serious issue with the production at Harrington and Richardson put a 
complete halt on all commercial M-14 production. As per the contracts, ordnance officials 
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selected samples of production rifles from all three producers (Springfield Armory, 
Winchester-Olin, and Harrington and Richardson) for quality control testing at Fort Benning. 
On several Harrington and Richardson M-14 rifles, the bolts literally disintegrated during test 
firings, one of the worst types of failures in a semi-automatic or fully automatic rifle. The 
7.62 NATO cartridge operates at extremely high pressures, and a failed bolt creates a 
shrapnel laced explosion that can seriously or even mortally injure the person operating the 
weapon. For two months, officials from all the government arsenals and Aberdeen Proving 
Grounds investigated the Winchester and the Harrington and Richardson production 
facilities, as well as all their subcontractors187. The same officials also sought a non-
destructive method of testing all M-14 bolts and receivers on the already-produced rifles. The 
Army would not issue a single M-14 from the two companies until the rifles underwent the 
testing and analysis procedure.  
 The testing procedure involved inserting a receiver or bolt of unknown quality into an 
electromagnetic analyzer with one of known quality. The analyzer measured the quality of 
the unknown part through electromagnetic conductivity.  Investigators eventually traced all 
the bolt and receiver failures to Harrington and Richardson188. For its receivers and bolts, the 
company had used a substitute steel, since the 1959 steel strike made getting the specified 
steel expensive and difficult189. This substitute steel used on receivers became overly hard 
and brittle when heat-treated to Springfield Armory specifications. The bolts failures from 
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Harrington and Richardson were due to poor heat treatment of the steel, causing cracking and 
sheering of the locking lugs190.  
 After identifying and fixing the catastrophic failures at Harrington and Richardson, 
the production continued to be slow. Both Winchester and the Harrington and Richardson 
companies were lagging behind on their quotas, while their rifles met exceptionally high 
rejection rates. This problem led to the creation of Project 110, a group of Department of 
Defense and Army officials determined to correct all production issues with M-14 
procurement191. Project 110’s investigations led the Department of Defense to enact more 
stringent quality control at both production centers, causing great protest from both 
manufacturers. Winchester and Harrington and Richardson complained that such measures 
altered their contracts and that they could not make the rifle at the original quoted unit price 
of $65.75 for Winchester192 and $68.75193 for Harrington and Richardson. The companies 
won their protests and the renegotiated per unit cost was raised to $95.00194. Because of the 
loss of two months production at both commercial firms and the loss of 1,784 rifles that the 
quality control testers pulled for being utterly defective, Springfield Armory’s quota changed 
from 2,000 rifles per month to 5,000 in March 1961195. The Department of Defense also 
decided to add a third commercial contractor for M-14 rifles, with hopes of speeding up the 
procurement of new rifles in March 1961. Over forty commercial firms applied for the 
contract, which did not allow the contracting firm to renegotiate price once having signed the 
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agreement. Choosing from a wide variety of arms and heavy industry manufacturers 
(Armalite included, ironically) the Department of Defense awarded the third M-14 
production contract to the Cleveland, Ohio firm of Thompson- Ramo -Wooldridge196. 
 In March 1961, Winchester’s deadline for the delivery of the last of its 35,000 rifles 
came and went. It was not until the next month that the company began meeting its monthly 
quota of rifles. By June, the Harrington and Richardson plant was producing rifles at an 
acceptable rate per month. However, there still only existed 133,000 M-14 rifles, many of 
which Springfield Armory completed under its increasingly raised monthly quotas197. This 
situation raised enough issues to prompt a congressional investigation into the M-14 
program. The Senate Committee on Armed Services created a Preparedness Investigation 
Subcommittee to examine the research, development, and procurements problems of the M-
14 and determine a proper course of action. The tone of the Senate hearings echoed the voice 
of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, whose testimony in front of Congress on July 28, 
1961, labeled the Rifle Program as “a disgrace…not particularly for the Army, but for the 
Nation”198.  
 The following month, Harrington and Richardson completed its first contract for 
35,000 M-14 rifles. Normally, news of this might have alleviated the poor reputation of the 
Rifle Program199. Instead, that same month, news broke from Berlin about the increasingly 
tense crisis there between communist and American forces. The news mentioned that all 
5,000 of the American troops stationed in West Berlin were equipped with M1 Garand rifles 
and that the 1,500 reinforcement troops coming to assist the western forces there had only the 
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M1 Garand as their rifle, all this four years after M-14 procurement began200. In 1961, West 
Berlin was the forefront of America’s commitment against communist expansion and the 
soldiers still carried weapons designed before the Second World War. That October, the 
Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness released its report, which highlighted the 
incompetence and malaise that had characterized the Rifle Program201. The committee placed 
blame equally on the commercial contractors and the government.  
 The subcommittee commented on the importance of a new rifle, for while the basic 
rifle might seem obsolete in the age of more sophisticated weapons like ballistic missiles, it 
remained fundamental to land warfare202. The congressional report blasted the policy of 
limiting production at Springfield Armory, noting that during 1958 it was the only place 
tooled and equipped for M-14 manufacture203. The report stated that as of July 1, 1961, only 
133,386 M-14 rifles existed in government armories. From this number, Springfield Armory 
production stood at 52,706, Harrington and Richardson 75,286, and Winchester only at 
5,394204. The report called for increasing the funding for M-14 production to ensure all 
regular units could receive the M-14 as soon as possible. However, the subcommittee stated 
that the M-14 was still not the ultimate weapon, writing, “While it is true that there is no 
weapon per se in the developmental stage to replace the M-14 today, nonetheless various 
concepts are under study by the Army to support requirements for an improved hand-held 
weapon.205” The report further noted, “The program study is primarily an ammunition 
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research program designed to increase the individual combat soldier’s combat effectiveness 
by providing a weapon-ammunition combination with increase hit and kill probability along 
with a reduction in the weight of the system.206” This could mean nothing else than Project 
SALVO, and hence the small caliber high velocity concept. The committee then 
recommended the Army properly fund this promising system207, to make sure that the 
lengthy delay the M-14 program received did not happen again208. As for the M-14 delays, 
the subcommittee blamed the poor funding, specifically noting that the entire program from 
1945-1961, excluding procurement, had only totaled $6,352,000209. The subcommittee 
considered this a paltry amount for such an important and fundamental project.  
 The committee ended its conclusions with a laundry list of “indisputable facts” 
regarding the Rifle Program that showed the Army lacking in urgency for an essential 
program. Most damning was that after 16 years since the issuing of the order to replace the 
Garand, the M1 rifle remained in widespread use. In addition, the report noted that for many 
years only one engineer (Lloyd Corbett) had worked on the T44 project, drastically 
lengthening the development of the rifle. Field-testing the prototypes took four years, much 
longer than normal.  After the last tests, it took eleven months to adopt the rifle, and from the 
adoption of the M-14 in May 1957 until April 1958, there was no attempt to procure rifles. 
Moreover, when procurement came, orders were for small amounts. These small contracts 
did not provide enough rifles for troops in strategic locations. Finally, the Department of 
Defense policy to limit Springfield Armory production caused unnecessary shortages in 
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rifles210. In light of the then current state of procurement, the geo-political situation, and any 
promising ordnance projects, the subcommittee issued its recommendations.  
 The recommendations in the report stated that given the past delay in M-14 
development and procurement, the Army now should take substantial steps to expedite and 
expand M-14 procurement. Any expansion of production through new contracts should be 
determined on the ability to produce M-14 rifles, not on economic conditions in the 
manufacturers’ area. In addition, Congress said the project managers recently appointed to 
oversee M-14 procurement needed more power to assure completion of the production 
contracts. The last recommendation looked to the future, stating that any weapons system 
developed and adopted by the Army to replace the M-14 should receive a high priority to 
ensure procurement issues would not happen again211. This report, combined with all the 
surrounding events, cast serious doubts on the quality of the Rifle Program from beginning to 
its status at the time of the report. Former M-14 supporters like Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara began to lose their faith in both Army Ordnance and in the rifle-ammunition 
package as a whole. Ordnance traditionalists around the Chief of Army Ordnance Rifle 
Development Frederick Carten sought to prop up the program as much as possible to ensure 
its continuation. Even the NRA got involved in a public relations campaign to try to salvage 
the reputation of the rifle.  
 The October 1961 American Rifleman contained an article titled “The M-14 Rifle- A 
Complete Report on the Status of the Nation’s New Shoulder Arm”. The article, written in 
part by retired ordnance officer E.H. Harrison, tried to improve the public opinion of the 
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Rifle Project by comparing the M-14 to its parent, the M1 Garand. The article outlined 
several positive facets of the program, including the lower per unit cost for the M-14212. It 
also gave a comparison with M1 Garand development to try to convince the public that the 
M-14 was not so long delayed in development and procurement213. The article did not 
mention that the M1 Garand had been a completely original design, and that along with 
inventing the rifle, John Garand and others also had to design specialized machinery the M1 
rifle required for mass production. While the article and other public relations efforts tried to 
soften the negative blow dealt to the Rifle Project by the Senate hearings, an increasing 
number of observers began to look for better options. The promising rifle and ammunition 
mentioned in the subcommittee report heralded the return of the M-14 program’s old 
nemesis, the AR-15. However, this time, the AR-15 came from a new company and via a 
new route.  
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Adoption and Failure of the M-16 in Vietnam 
 Fairchild Aircraft and its subsidiary Armalite spent nearly 1.45 million dollars on the 
development of the AR-15 and failed to unseat the ordnance corps’ M-14 Rifle. Fairchild, 
reeling from financial issues, sought to rid its Armalite division of the AR-15 and recoup 
some of the development capital. In December 1959, Armalite found Colt’s Patent Firearms 
Manufacturing Company, then a division of Fairbanks Whitney, willing to buy a license for 
the AR-15 and AR-10. Colt agreed to pay $75,000 upfront and a 4.5% royalty on every rifle 
sold214.  Colt also entered into a partnership with the Baltimore firm of Cooper-McDonald to 
broker the deal between Colt and Fairchild as well as to sell the design abroad in Asia. For 
these services, Colt spent an additional $250,000215. Colt, itself in financial trouble for over a 
decade, hoped to market the design to the Department of Defense and foreign militaries. Colt 
possessed a simple, two part sales strategy for selling the AR-15 to the U.S. military. First 
Colt wanted a retrial of the rifle with the expressed intention of demonstrating it in front of 
high-ranking Department of Defense officials. Second, Colt wanted to begin aggressive 
political and public relations campaigns to condemn the M-14 program. Colt officials hoped 
to sell the AR-15 rifle by marketing the company’s prestigious past of innovation, combined 
with this new and more aggressive strategy. 
 In June of 1960, Colt sent a request to the Chief of Army Ordnance Rifle 
Development, Dr. Carten, for a retrial of the new Colt AR-15. Colt updated the design with 
several of the Infantry User Boards’ earlier recommendations on the original Armalite AR-15 
such as a thicker barrel, a new magazine, and new hand guards. Carten refused the request, to 
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the vexation of the Colt representatives216.  The earlier proclamation by the Army Chief of 
Staff Maxwell Taylor that only the M-14 rifle could fulfill the Army’s needs gave validation 
to Carten’s stance against small caliber weapons. Carten used General Taylor’s assertion as 
the basis for denying Colt’s request. According to Taylor’s proclamation, there was no need 
in the Army for the AR-15, so Army Ordnance refused to test it. George Strichman, president 
of Colt stated later, “We were up against the NIH factor, Not Invented Here. The rifle’s basic 
problem was that it hadn’t been invented by Army arsenal personnel. They got the M-14 
adopted, and now they are covering their tracks. They resented the AR-15 being thrust upon 
them.217” This rejection only made Colt more aggressive in their persuasive efforts.  
 The ability of Colt to gain any military contracts hinged on getting the AR-15 into the 
United States arsenal somewhere. While Armalite concentrated on the domestic military 
market with the AR-15, Colt wanted McDonald-Cooper to sell the rifle in Asia. Here the 
politics of the Cold War blocked the ability of Cooper-McDonald to sell the Colt rifles. Many 
of the nations to which Robert McDonald promoted the AR-15 showed great enthusiasm, but 
could not buy them. Earlier these nations had signed military assistance agreements with the 
United States. Under these agreements, all weapons purchased by the Asian nations must be 
standard United States military hardware. Robert McDonald came back in 1960 after selling 
only handfuls of rifles to Asian nations for testing. Colt needed to get the rifle in the U.S. 
arsenal. It found its way in through the backdoor. 
 Colt, like Armalite, tried to pitch the AR-15 to the United States Army without 
success. Later in 1960, Colt and McDonald realized how to get around the Army and United 
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States Army Ordnance. They simply found an alternative route, appealing to the United 
States Air Force.  To this end Robert McDonald, and Richard Boutelle, the president of 
Armalite, invited the Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff General Curtis LeMay to a barbeque 
for Boutelle’s birthday on 4 July 1960218. McDonald demonstrated the AR-15 to LeMay and 
suggested that the United States Air Force adopt the weapon to replace the aging M2 
carbines in service at the time. While the Air Force had become independent of the Army in 
the late 1940’s, the Air Force still relied on the Army for its small arms. With the adoption of 
the M-14 in 1957, the Army and all the government arsenals were no longer stocking rifles or 
producing any parts for the M1 or M2 carbines. Indeed, the Army began selling spare M2 
carbines on the surplus market to allied nations at the time. This stuck the Air Force with a 
maligned and obsolete rifle, for which there was no parts or support. LeMay agreed to push 
the Air Force Chief of Staff to consider the new rifles and McDonald sent three rifles to 
Lackland Air Force Base in Texas for familiarization219.  
 Because the Air Force depended on the Army for their small arms, the Air Force 
officers relied on Army Ordnance for testing any new rifles.  After General LeMay sent a 
formal request to the Pentagon for the replacement of the M2 carbine with the Colt AR-15, 
the Pentagon (acting under Congressional pressure, part of Colt’s selling strategy) forced Dr. 
Carten to go ahead and arrange the test for the AR-15220. The orders given to Dr. Carten 
mentioned that General LeMay would attend the tests, thus ensuring fair testing. In 
November of 1960, Ordnance offered its report on the Colt AR-15221. In these tests, three 
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rifles fired 24,443 rounds of ammunition in accuracy and light automatic fire tests222. During 
rapid-fire tests at 100 yards, the rifles proved very accurate, hitting the 100 yard target 77 
times out of the 84 shots fired in one minute223. Ten shot groupings at 100 yards averaged 1.5 
inches in diameter, an outstanding display of accuracy224. In fully automatic fire, the rifle 
fired an average of 128 rounds per minute, hitting the target an average of 41 times225. This 
figure was higher than comparable tests on the M2 carbine. The rifle broke only ten parts in 
the 18,000 round endurance tests for an average of 0.25 malfunctions per hundred rounds 
fired226. According to Carten, the rifles performed at only a “near-normal” level in un-
lubricated, dust, extreme cold, mud, and rain tests227. However, this time the rain test allowed 
the operator to retract the bolt, solving the capillary action issue that had discredited the 
original Armalite rifles in earlier tests228. Despite the fact that the AR-15 performed 
exceedingly well, even compared to the previous M1 Garand and M-14 tests, Dr. Carten still 
deemed the tests only “reasonably satisfactory”, continuing to deny that the design and 
ammunition possessed any real technical merit229.  
 Following the trials, the Air Force did its own comparative firing tests between the 
M2 carbine, the Colt AR-15, and the M-14 rifle. Eugene Stoner recorded that 43% of the 
firers qualified as experts with the AR-15, while only 22% did so with the M-14230.After 
these tests, the Air Force attempted to buy 8,500 AR-15 rifles as part of their general funding 
for the year. The Congressional Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations 
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denied the request. General LeMay then tried to go through President John Kennedy, but did 
not succeed in receiving funding for new rifles. The Air Force budget prioritized new 
fighters, bombers, missiles, and air defense systems, instead of rifles for guarding bases. The 
Air Force officially adopted the AR-15 but they could procure no rifles until the budget 
allowed. However, now that the rifle was officially in the U.S. arsenal, it underwent further 
trials. The Combat Development Experimentation Center finished optimum platoon trials 
that showed a five-man squad with AR-15 rifles and ammunition had the same firepower as 
eleven men with M-14 rifles231. Indeed, the report suggested that the Army look into the AR-
15 “with a view toward early retirement of current rifles”232. Finally, the Air Force received 
procurement funds in May 1962 and began to rearm its personnel233.  
 Intrigued by the new Air Force rifle, the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the 
Department of Defense ordered 1,000 AR-15 rifles in spring 1961 for testing in the growing 
Vietnam conflict. This was part of the United States’ advising role in the conflict at the time. 
The Advanced Research Projects Agency wanted the rifles for Project AGILE, a project 
aimed at supporting allies in a limited war. The agency released its report on the AR-15 in 
July 1962234.  In this test, Project AGILE sought to determine the best rifle for the armed 
forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Given the small stature of the average South Vietnamese 
soldier, the project sought to test the lighter AR-15 rifle against the M2 carbine235. The nature 
of the war in Vietnam, one of fast, brutal, short firefights, along with the small stature and 
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low weight of the average Vietnamese soldier, required a light rifle capable of automatic 
fire236. This requirement fit only two weapons in the United States arsenal, the M2 carbine 
and the AR-15. Tests revealed the AR-15 and its ammunition to be superior to the M2 and 
the agency report suggested that all South Vietnamese forces receive the AR-15 rifle in place 
of other U.S. arms237. Further reports in Vietnam from Project AGILE military advisors 
reported that the AR-15 and its ammunition did indeed have extraordinary lethality at short-
ranges. The U.S. Advisor Group in Vietnam requested 20,000 AR-15 rifles for South 
Vietnamese forces in the summer of 1962238. This, in addition to the two Air Force orders for 
8,500 and 19,000 AR-15 rifles that year, combined with the poor publicity surrounding the 
M-14 procurements, made Colt look good and Army Ordnance look poor for passing up the 
AR-15239.  
 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, once a fervent M-14 supporter, saw more of 
its disadvantages as M-14 procurement lagged and reports praising the Colt AR-15 crossed 
his desk. Becoming more disillusioned with the M-14 and the ordnance corps altogether, 
McNamara ordered his comptroller, Charles Hitch, to research the history of arms 
development going back to the 1930’s to search for the best rifle system. Hitch arranged 
comparative trials of the M1 Garand, the M-14, the Soviet AK-47, and the Colt AR-15. The 
summation of the report damned any remaining notion that the M-14 was a modern and 
acceptable rifle. Hitch stated, “The AR-15 is decidedly superior in many of the factors 
considered. In none of them is the M-14 superior. The report, therefore, concludes that in 
combat the AR-15 is the superior weapon. Furthermore, the available cost data indicates 
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that it is also a cheaper weapon. Although analyzed less thoroughly, the M-14 also appears 
somewhat inferior to the M1 rifle of WWII and decidedly inferior to the Soviet combat rifle 
AK-47, which in turn was derived from the German “Sturmgewehr” of WWII”240. While 
Hitch’s analysis of the cost of the AR-15 rifle now seems unreliable due to his lack of 
analysis on retooling and production set up, the analysis of combat reliability and overall 
combat usefulness was fundamentally sound.  
 All of the negative reports on the M-14, in contrast to the positive reports on the AR-
15 as a very reliable and fully developed weapon, made the Army Chief of Staff and the 
Secretary of Defense order a worldwide study of the two rifles to identify the superior 
platform. Secretary of Defense McNamara gave General Earle Wheeler, the Army Chief of 
Staff, three months to complete the new testing, starting in fall 1962. The short time allotted, 
and factionalism in the various testing authorities, created a number of issues that only raised 
more questions about Army Ordnance. Ammunition quality for the Colt rifles was extremely 
poor, causing an abnormally high malfunction rate241.  The ammunition could not replicate 
the fantastic wounding capabilities reported by military advisors in Vietnam, raising 
questions about the lethality of the 5.56mm ammunition242.  However, Colt and ordnance 
officials constantly complained about materials and procedure, raising questions about the 
validity of all the test results. Despite all the problems, in January 1963 the Inspector 
General’s office issued its final report on time. The report declared that after firing 500,000 
rounds of ammunition, the AR-15 proved superior in accuracy in automatic fire, weight, and 
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hit probability. However, the M-14 was superior in reliability and night sight capability243.  
In spite of the report, the M-14 remained the standard rifle since it showed increased 
reliability (most likely due to ammunition quality). However, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Cyrus Vance recommended the purchase of 50,000 to 100,000 AR-15 rifles for airborne and 
special assault troops244. 
 The Army soon realized the M-14 program was in serious trouble.  From 1963-1964, 
South Vietnamese troops carrying the M1 Garand and M2 carbines began to encounter 
enemy troops armed with Chinese made AK-47 and SKS rifles245. The nature of jungle 
warfare suited the low powered, short-range, fast firing Kalashnikov and Simonov rifles 
while negating the M1 Garand’s advantage of long-range power and accuracy. Ordnance 
officials, seeing the reports on Vietnam, began to push for the Special Purpose Individual 
Weapon Project as the eventual solution. This program, like the AR-15, grew from Project 
SALVO in the 1950’s. This weapon system was more a long-range shotgun than a rifle, 
using the multiple steel flechette principle. Army Ordnance, after working on it slowly for 
years, promised a finished and fully developed prototype by 1965246. Army Ordnance issued 
additional funding and four new developmental contracts for the Special Purpose Individual 
Weapon program. Ordnance was gambling on the program to keep the civilian designed AR-
15 from eclipsing Army Ordnance’s projects. The move backfired in the face of Army 
Ordnance when Secretary of Defense McNamara decided to terminate all procurement of the 
M-14 at the end of the fiscal year 1963 and close Springfield Armory at the end of the 1968 
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fiscal year247. This would leave the Army with one million M-14 rifles, which McNamara felt 
should suffice until the Special Purpose Individual Weapon came online. However, to 
supplement the M-14 numbers the Defense Department signed a one-time buy contract of 
85,000 AR-15 rifles for the Army and 19,000 for the Air Force248. In addition, the 
government required certain technical changes to correct the perceived shortcomings of the 
AR-15 platform. Secretary of Defense McNamara created the Office of Project Manager for 
AR-15 Activities to oversee the new Technical Coordinating Committee. McNamara 
appointed younger ordnance officers and civilians to staff the Technical Coordinating 
Committee, removing the traditionalists from any significant role in AR-15 refinement and 
procurement.  McNamara placed Lt. Col. Harold Yount in charge of the committee and 
named him the Chief of the Office of Project Manager for AR-15 Activities249. The goal was 
to have a standardized AR-15 completed by the end of the 1964 fiscal year. However, the 
Technical Coordinating Committee complicated standardization with members proposing 
130 changes to the rifle, eleven of which met final approval250. While this delayed 
standardization, several further issues still arose involving the rifle and ammunition 
combination.  
 The first major debate was over the lack of a bolt closure device on the AR-15. The 
general argument from the Army was that the only thing closing the action on the AR-15 was 
the recoil spring located inside the butt stock. In its official recommendation to the Technical 
Coordinating Committee, the Army contended that “The AR-15 is to be issued to Combat 
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Infantrymen who are expected to use the weapon under the worst possible conditions of dust, 
dirt, mud, and foreign matter affecting both weapon and cartridges. If the mechanical spring 
fails to close the bolt the soldier must have the capability of immediately correcting the 
situation without disassembling the rifle.  Any chance, no matter how slight, of malfunction 
in combat due to the inability to manually close the bolt is unacceptable.251”  On the earlier 
M1 Garand and M-14 rifles, the operator could easily bump the rear of the charging handle 
with the heel of his hand to fully seat a round of ammunition into the chamber. The AR-15 
lacked this ability, and so the Army became insistent on modifying the rifle to include a bolt 
closure device. While this modification seems simple, the issue became a contention over the 
best bolt closure device. Four bolt closure devices came under consideration, two from 
Springfield Armory and two from Colt Firearms. The Technical Coordination Committee 
accepted one design by Colt; however, the Air Force, Navy, and Marines both protested 
against that choice in their official responses to the Army proposal252. Eventually the Army 
won out, for no other fact than they were going to be the largest user of the rifle.  
 Another issue that arose in 1963 was regarding ammunition. The trials of the AR-15 
used relatively small amounts of ammunition from a few select sources of production. 
However, as the military was switching away from the exclusive 7.62 NATO cartridges, it 
had to replenish its stocks of ammunition, which required large-scale production. This meant 
the use of multiple production sources with unavoidable variances. Once the military started 
to test new batches of the 5.56mm ammunition, the test rifles started slam firing253. The 
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Frankford Arsenal investigated the matter and released its report on April 4, 1963254. The 
report stressed that the problem was intermittent. Some rifle and ammunition combinations 
had demonstrated small percentages of slam firing, while others demonstrated an excessive 
amount of the occurrence255. The investigation concluded that the fault was a combination of 
the design of the AR-15 firing pin and the variances in primer sensitivity on the cartridges256. 
It did stress the fact that the primers used in the 5.56mm cartridge were very sensitive, having 
a very narrow range between not firing and firing and that the occurrences of slam firing 
should be even higher than reported257. However, the report gave no proposals for a solution 
to the problem.  
 The solution eventually became to alter the firing pin. The firing pin on the AR-15 
was free floating in design, allowing the pin to gain enough kinetic energy on the loading 
cycle to fly forward and set off sensitive cartridge primers, causing an unintentional 
discharge of the rifle. Springfield Armory and Colt Firearms submitted various proposals to 
fix the firing pin issue. The Springfield design used a ball detent system to add resistance to 
the firing pin on its forward movement. Colt proposed two solutions; one added a resistance 
spring, and the other reduced the mass of the firing pin to reduce the kinetic energy258. As in 
the case with the bolt closure device, the Technical Coordination Committee selected the 
Colt proposal of reducing mass in the firing pin259. 
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 However, ammunition problems continued well into 1965. The completed AR-15 
technical data package included the specifications for the 5.56mm ammunition as well. The 
ammunition specifications were contradictory. The minimum muzzle velocity requirements 
called for no less than 3,220 feet per second with a maximum chamber pressure of 52,000 
pounds per square inch, using DuPont’s IMR4475 propellant260. Because the DuPont 
IMR4475 propellant could not reliably achieve the minimum muzzle velocity without 
exceeding the maximum allowable chamber pressure, the Technical Coordination Committee 
assigned Frankford Arsenal to investigate the possible use of substitute propellants to meet 
the specifications outlined in the technical data package261. Frankford Arsenal initially 
recommended a slight reduction in the muzzle velocity requirements, as the Frankford 
technicians believed that the ammunition lethality would not suffer and it would allow the 
ammunition to meet the chamber pressure limits while still using the Du Pont IMR 
propellant262. However, the Technical Coordinating Committee rejected the proposal to 
change any of the velocity specifications. 
 Frankford Arsenal selected three possible propellant substitutes from those submitted 
by various commercial manufacturers. DuPont submitted their CR8136 propellant, which 
was similar to the IMR4475 formula as an extruded single based propellant derived from 
nitrocellulose. However, DuPont coated CR8136 with a different compound, which reduced 
flame temperature. This alternative coating had the benefits of causing less barrel erosion and 
creating a more controlled burn rate that allowed for a better pressure to velocity ratio263.  
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Olin-Mathieson, the ammunition division of Winchester Arms, submitted their WC846 
propellant. This was a double base propellant based on nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine. The 
denser nature and composition of Olin WC846 allowed the manufacturer to load it more 
easily into the small cartridge case of the 5.56mm, and thus allowed for easier mass 
production264. WC846 also allowed easier loading adjustments to stay under the chamber 
pressure specifications while meeting the muzzle velocity requirements. The third propellant, 
HPC-10, came from the Hercules company. It was a double based, extruded, and tubular 
shaped propellant. HPC-10 in the past had created barrel erosion issues and chamber pressure 
spikes in cold weather265.  
 The tests involved the measuring of 20 rounds of ammunition fired through two 
barrels. At ambient temperature, the DuPont and Olin propellants showed a much more 
favorable pressure to velocity ratio, while the Hercules submission posted nearly identical 
numbers266. The test eventually showed that the Hercules powder was not suitable because it 
created dangerous pressure spikes in lower temperatures, and exhibited more pronounced 
barrel erosion than the original DuPont IMR4475 propellant267. However, the report declared 
that both the DuPont CR8136 extruded formula and Olin’s WC846 ball powder were suitable 
for loading in the 5.56mm cartridge268. From this report, the Technical Coordinating 
Committee approved the Olin Mathieson WC846 ball powder for use in the 5.56mm M193 
cartridge. This made sense from a logistical standpoint, since the 7.62 NATO ammunition 
utilized the same propellant. The propellant possessed a longer record of accomplishment for 
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reliability and stability in long-term storage. The M-14 was phasing out at the time; however, 
the army still used 7.62 NATO ammunition in its M-60 machine gun. The ability to use the 
same propellant in both standard cartridges made logistics and quality control easier, since 
Olin Mathieson was already equipped and producing large quantities of ball powder and 
ammunition for the United States Military.  
 In all, the Technical Coordination Committee made eleven changes to the rifle from 
the original AR-15 prototype. Aside from the firing pin and bolt closure issues, the remaining 
changes were made for ergonomic or aesthetic purposes, with the exception of increasing the 
rifling twist of the barrel to create better long-range accuracy in arctic environments where 
the denser air required a more stabilized bullet269. With a finalized technical data package, 
Colt started production and delivered the first small batch of twenty rifles in early March 
1964, despite ongoing ammunition procurement issues270.  
 It soon became clear the Special Purpose Individual Weapon was not going to be 
ready anytime in the near future. With the increasing American presence in Southeast Asia, it 
became apparent that the amount of M-14 rifles on hand would not meet America’s frontline 
needs in Vietnam, Europe, and Korea. Because of this, the Technical Coordination 
Committee, with the approval of Secretary of Defense McNamara, invoked a clause in the 
original Colt contract, expanding the number of rifles on order by nearly 34,000271. However, 
the new Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, ordered a reevaluation of the small 
arms weapons program to see if the Army had indeed procured the best rifle for current 
engagements, and to see what other options were out there. To complete the study, the new 
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Army Chief of Staff appointed Lt. Col. Yount as the head of the Project Management Office 
for Rifles to coordinate the new Small Arms Weapons Systems (SAWS) study272. The report 
released in December of 1964 presented several options to the Army Chief of Staff.  
 After studying several other 5.56mm designs such as the German Heckler and Koch 
HK33, the Cadillac-Gage Stoner 63 (designed by Eugene Stoner), the Armalite AR-18, and 
the maligned Special Purpose Individual Weapon program, the final report presented four 
alternatives. The military could revert to the M-14 as the best possible rifle for the situation. 
The production facilities were still in place and production could resume in less than six 
months. Until production could start up, the U.S. military could temporarily use a number of 
other designs such as the M-16, M-14, BAR, and M1 Garand273. A general phase-out of other 
weapons would then occur as M-14 production began to meet demand. The second 
alternative was to continue with the Colt M-16 rifle as an interim service rifle until the 
Special Purpose Individual Weapon System matured. The M-16 would reach full 
procurement by 1967274. The third option was to select another platform as an interim rifle. 
Again, production would allow full procurement by 1967 or 1968275. The final alternative 
was to go with the Special Purpose Individual Weapon System, which would reach 
production by 1970 if all went according to plan276. Col. Yount made no recommendation as 
to the preferred course of action.  
 However, as the Vietnam War escalated and America became an active participant, 
the M-14 equipped troops found the M-14 not well suited to jungle warfare. The M-14’s 
                                                 
272
 Ibid. 187 
273
 Yount, Lt. Col. Harold. Officer of Project Manager: Project Curtailment/Termination Study.(Washington 
DC : Department of Defense. December 3, 1963), 1 
274
 Ibid. 1 
275
 Ibid. 1 
276
 Ibid. 1 
 92
heavy weight and low rate of fire gave American troops a disadvantage. As had been the case 
with the M1 Garand rifles of the South Vietnamese forces, the jungle negated any advantages 
from the long-range precision and power of the M-14 rifle/ammunition package. Realizing 
this, the military issued more M-16 rifles to new troops and withdrew the M-14 rifles, citing 
the inadequate supply of M-14 rifles and parts, as well as the request from General William 
Westmoreland for more of the new rifles277.  By 1966, the M-16 was in wide use by many 
troops in Vietnam, but various weapons malfunctions began to occur278. By June 24, of 1966, 
Col. Yount began to receive memos from superiors asking why M-16 rifles were failing in 
the field279. Throughout the rest of 1966 and early 1967, the amount of failures (especially 
failures to extract spent cartridge casings) regarding the M-16 became alarming. The 
commanders in Vietnam knew of the problems, as did Army Ordnance and Defense 
Department officials. However, in the spring of 1967, the M-16 failures became public.  
 In May of 1967, letters from combat soldiers and angry family members began to 
arrive in the offices of congressional representatives. On May 22, 1967, Representative 
James Howard of New Jersey read a letter written by a combat Marine to his family. The 
shocked and enraged family had forwarded the disturbing letter to their congressional 
representative280. Representative Howard emphasized a few specific phrases to Congress. He 
read to Congress, “Believe it or not, you know what killed most of us? Our own rifles281.”  
The marine continued, “Practically every one of our dead was found with his rifle torn down 
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next to him where he had been trying to fix it282.” After Rep. Howard finished the letter, the 
M-16 problem became national news. The Armed Services Committee of the House of 
Representatives formed a special investigative committee, headed by Representative Richard 
Ichord, to check into the problem with the M-16 and to seek a solution283.  
 On October 19, 1967, the Special Subcommittee on the M-16 Rifle program released 
its official report on the current rifle program284. The report was as damning to the new 
civilian run M-16 program as had been the earlier Senate investigation into the Army 
Ordnance M-14 program. The committee vocally proclaimed their suspicions regarding 
questionable testing practices and the lack of objectivity by Army Ordnance during the 
development and trials of the AR-15 rifle285. However, it also questioned the actions of 
Secretary of Defense McNamara and his methods for M-16 rifle procurement. From 1963 
until 1967, the Department of Defense had continued to pay large sums of money to keep M-
14 production lines ready for operation, even though it began replacing the M-14 with the M-
16 in 1963286. The subcommittee questioned why these lines of production never produced 
any desperately needed M-16 rifles287. It also brought attention to a technical assistance team 
report from Colt specialists, who had visited Vietnam in the fall of 1966 when reports of 
malfunctions became alarming288. The Colt report stated that the rifles encountered were 
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excessively dirty and corroded, the ammunition was approximately 15% defective, and half 
of ammunition magazines did not work properly due to damage289.  
 The subcommittee also declared that ammunition caused many malfunctions in 
combination with the lack of training, no user manuals, and few maintenance supplies290. The 
lack of maintenance caused failures to extract spent cartridges. These malfunctions required 
the use of a cleaning rod to push out the stuck casing, but the shortage of cleaning rods 
caused many rifles to become useless in the field. The report chronicled the death of one 
marine corporal killed while he was running up and down a firing line pushing stuck 
cartridge casings out of jammed rifles with the only cleaning rod291. The lack of proper 
lubricants and cleaning chemicals caused many soldiers to improvise. However, given the 
lack of training and manuals, many improvisations actually aggravated the malfunctions292. 
The subcommittee traced the ammunition issue to the use of Olin Mathieson’s ball powder as 
the primary propellant in the 5.56mm cartridges293. Ball powder, although allowing the 
chamber pressure to remain in check, created more pressure at the gas port since it burns 
more progressively than the DuPont powder. The resulting higher port pressure caused more 
gas to impinge on the action, resulting in a higher cyclic rate in automatic fire and greater 
wear on various parts294. In addition to a higher cyclic rate, the ball powder produced a 
significant amount of fouling in the action295.  While ball powder never caused fouling issues 
in the M-14 and other 7.62 NATO weapons due to the use of a gas piston operating system, 
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the direct gas impingement system used on the Colt M-16 allowed gas residue to enter the 
action and create feeding and extraction issues. As early as November 1965, Colt reported 
the possibility of issues regarding ball powder, indicating as many as 50% of rifles might 
ultimately fail with ball powder296. However, the Department of Defense increasingly 
replaced the DuPont propellants with ball powder as the war escalated.  
 The report also placed blame on Colt for problems related to the M-16 program. Colt 
paid royalties on every M-16 rifle produced to Fairchild Aircraft for the use of Eugene 
Stoner’s patents. Colt’s dire financial situation made them resist all attempts by the 
government to get other production spurces online for the M-16 in order to get maximum 
profit.  Because all M-16 rifles came from a single source, the supply of rifles and parts 
barely met the needs of the American forces. In addition to this, Colt also sold large numbers 
of the rifle to Singapore in 1967, further straining the supply situation297.  
 The report on the M-16 rifle program showed the disarray of rifle development, 
testing, and procurement from 1956 up until that point in 1967. Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara, the man who had stripped Army Ordnance of its prestige and power after the M-
14 debacle of 1957-1963, now faced a rifle debacle of his own. While the congressional 
subcommittee did find and recommend some improvements to the rifle, it showed the 
Department of Defense had made several crucial mistakes in its M-16 procurements. The 
long delays caused by Technical Coordination Committee, use of ball powder as a propellant, 
the blind faith exhibited in the M-16 as shown by the lack of cleaning supplies, the 
unwillingness to listen to ordnance experts, and the inability to correct the malfunctions 
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without a congressional investigation all seriously tarnished the new system of rifle 
development and procurement. While in the past, Army Ordnance and the Chief of Army 
Ordinance Rifle Development had ultimately made decisions on rifle procurement and 
development, McNamara personally oversaw the M-16 procurement.  
 While Colt Firearms received a scolding on production faults, they escaped blame for 
creating the faith in the M-16 that led to so many problems. When Colt issued the first 
manual on the AR-15, it had stated plainly, “Disassembly, assembly, cleaning and minor 
repairs may be undertaken by anybody. An occasional simple cleaning will keep the weapon 
functioning indefinitely. Working parts can be cleaned by wiping with a cloth. The simplicity 
of field cleaning makes it possible to quickly and easily train a recruit in minimum time.”  
The Colt manual also stated, “Corrosion resistant materials facilitate the assembly and 
interchangeability of parts and reduce the service and maintenance of the Colt AR-15 to an 
absolute minimum. Firing of the Colt AR-15 with complete absence of lubricants in a 
chemically cleaned condition has in every county where this test has taken place resulted in a 
performance far exceeding any requirements. The Colt AR-15 Rifle will fire longer without 
cleaning or oiling than any other known rifle298.” This might explain, in combination with 
low supplies of M-16 rifles, why soldiers received training in boot camp on the M-14, but 
received the M-16 once in a combat zone with no additional training299. It also explains the 
lack of cleaning supplies and technical manuals. Following the subcommittee’s report, the 
military issued small booklets instructing users in the cleaning and lubricating of the M-16, 
recommending, “clean your rifle every chance you get. 3-5 times a day will not be too often 
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in some cases”300. This high maintenance, in combination with changes in ammunition, 
cleaning supplies, and small improvements to the rifle such as hard chromium plating 
internal parts to resist corrosion, brought malfunctions down to an acceptable level. 
However, the M-16 continued to face scrutiny until the end of the war, its once shining 
reputation utterly tarnished by the malfunctions of 1966 and 1967. 
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Conclusion 
 The report of the subcommittee on the M-16 rifle program brought to light the 
shortcomings of American rifle development from 1950 until 1967. The unwillingness of the 
leadership of the United States Army, Marine Corps, and Army Ordnance to recognize the 
realities of modern warfare by learning from experiences in the Second World War resulted 
in a path of rifle development that pitted innovation against traditionalism simultaneously. 
The specifications chosen for the development of a new rifle under the Light Rifle Project 
were not just difficult as in past projects (such as the M1 Garand); they were in many ways 
impossible. The stipulation that a selective-fire-capable light rifle fire a .30 caliber full power 
cartridge ignored earlier developments in America and Europe, as well as simple Newtonian 
physics. The M1 Garand improvement projects of the Second World War had clearly 
demonstrated that even the heavy M1 Garand was impossible to control in fully automatic 
fire. Because military leaders were unwilling to overcome the long tradition of long-range 
precision fire that dictated powerful cartridges, the Light Rifle Project became a program of 
compromises. In abandoning the issue of weight, and eventually the idea of full automatic 
fire, these decisions reduced the final product to nothing more than a Garand improvement 
project.   
 Along the path from M1 Garand to M-14, the U.S. Military and United States Army 
Ordnance took a stance that strained relations with key European allies. The tensions over 
caliber and platform choice between Great Britain and the United States caused a period of 
cooled relations and disinclination to cooperate. Great Britain, realizing the directions of 
change in warfare, took full advantage of the World War II German developments in 
intermediate cartridges and applied those ideas to an innovative bull pup platform. However, 
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the British .280 cartridge did not meet the standards of U.S. Army Ordnance, rooted in the 
late nineteenth century tradition of long-range marksmanship. When the United States 
successfully maneuvered other nations such as France to side against Great Britain, the 
British decided to go their own path. This action, although ultimately reversed by the 
incoming Churchill conservative government, undermined any momentum toward reaching 
the goal of a standard rifle and cartridge for NATO. Although the Churchill government tried 
to compromise with America by adopting the American cartridge in hopes of settling on a 
standard rifle design, United States Army Ordnance still resisted foreign designs vehemently. 
This resulted in nationalism and old grudges dictating NATO rifle developments. In the end, 
NATO possessed several different platforms that only shared a common cartridge.  
 However, behind these international controversies, within the U.S. military itself, the 
appearance of a unified Army Ordnance was merely a veneer. Within the ranks of junior 
officers and civilians came support for divergent theories of weapons and warfare. From 
1950 to 1953, a series of studies and small projects presented evidence and opinions on the 
reality of modern warfare and small arms development that sharply contradicted top military 
leader’s assumptions. The Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University in 
combination with the Ballistics Research Laboratory of Aberdeen Proving Grounds, 
proposed a view of combat more in line with the European mindset. The Second World War 
and the Korean War presented evidence that war was increasingly becoming a short-range 
and fierce affair where volume of fire dictated success or failure more than the old idea of 
long-range accuracy. This set of alternate perspectives inside of Army Ordnance proposed a 
different solution to the weapons question, more closely matching the reality of modern 
combat, in the form of the small caliber high velocity cartridge. Advocates declared that 
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small calibers offered increased volume of fire, lethality, and hit probability, in contrast to 
the European intermediate cartridges at most ranges. However, the top leadership in Army 
Ordnance suppressed the internal dissent through limitation of new research funds and 
priority. Army Ordnance relegated small caliber projects to long-term development 
programs, placing them in stagnation.  
 While resisting the developments of weapons design taking place in Europe, U.S. 
Army Ordnance also opposed interference from the commercial sector. Army Ordnance 
passionately guarded its prestige and power in the development of military small arms, 
earned by the success of the M1 Garand against all challengers. The Armalite AR-10 rifle did 
not seriously challenge the Light Rifle Project; however, when Armalite returned in 1958 
with a small caliber high velocity rifle in the AR-15, Army Ordnance resisted the new 
commercial design on all fronts. Certain events, decisions, omissions, and orders made by 
high-ranking Army Ordnance officials shed suspicion on testing practices and the objectivity 
of the ordnance corps. By resorting to these questionable and apparently dishonest acts, 
Army Ordnance successfully overcame the Armalite challenge a second time. However, the 
design resurfaced under the leadership of the more influential and determined Colt firm, who 
proved more aggressive in pressing their attacks on the new Army Ordnance M-14 service 
rifle. Continuing procurement problems with the M-14, combined with the successful 
strategy of selling the AR-15 to the United States Air Force in 1961, raised increasing doubts 
about the competence of Army Ordnance leaders, following a congressional investigation, 
the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1961 confirmed the mistakes in M-14 procurement. 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, a one-time supporter of Army Ordnance, lost faith 
in the organization and its rifle, terminating procurement of the M-14 and closing Springfield 
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Armory, the chief research and development center for Army Ordnance. This coincided with 
a shift to relying on more civilians and younger officers for leadership on rifle development 
and procurement through the creation of the Technical Coordinating Committee. 
 Upon termination of the M-14 procurement programs in 1963, the Department of 
Defense ordered the only viable alternative, the Colt AR-15, to supplement rifle stocks in the 
U.S. military. Unfortunately, the earlier lack of interest on the part of the Army had caused 
stagnation in the development of the rifle. The new leadership of the rifle program worked to 
ready the AR-15 for adoption as soon as possible under the Technical Coordination 
Committee. However, the evaluations of the AR-15 created an air of overconfidence in the 
basic design. The Technical Coordination Committee eventually corrected some deficiencies 
in the rifle, while adding features to quell infighting between the Air Force, Army, and 
Marine Corps. However, the Technical Coordination Committee, in a rush to get the new M-
16 into production, made several fateful decisions regarding the ammunition and the rifle that 
became apparent in the escalating Vietnam War.  
 When the M-16 entered service in late 1965, reports of malfunctioning rifles began to 
increase at an alarming rate. The problem escalated throughout 1966 and early 1967, when a 
concerned family of a Marine sent a copy of a letter home to their congressional 
representative, who then read it aloud before the U.S. House of Representatives. The letter 
blamed the rifle for the deaths of several fellow soldiers on the malfunctioning rifles. This 
stirred a political and media frenzy, causing an investigation into the M-16 program in May 
1967. The investigation blamed the new Technical Coordination Committee, the Secretary of 
Defense, and Colt Firearms for the issues regarding the rifle. The Technical Coordination 
Committee and the Secretary of Defense, so troubled by the poor performance of Army 
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Ordnance during the Light Rifle Project, became overly enthusiastic about the chief 
challenger to the ordnance corps’ M-14 rifle, believing the views of Colt and Armalite over 
the remaining old guard within the ordnance corps. The new officials entirely bought into the 
earlier Colt assertion that the AR-15 rifle was extraordinarily reliable in all conditions and 
required virtually no maintenance or training, while ignoring evidence to the contrary, even 
when it came from respectable sources such as Frankford Arsenal. When the M-16 began 
service, few soldiers received training on it and fewer received any cleaning supplies. This 
faith, combined with the fateful decision to make changes to the 5.56mm ammunition caused 
the rifles to fail one after another at an alarming rate. By the time the U.S. military corrected 
the mistakes, soldiers lost all confidence in the rifle.  Although the M-16 continues to serve 
in all branches of the armed forces of America over 40 years later, longer than any other rifle, 
its reputation still suffers.  
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